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3ABSTRACT
The question of policy with regards to the management of the rights of 
minorities within Turkey has at certain intervals, as is now, a matter of intense 
public debate as well as political differences and social grievances.  Despite 
such fervor, both foreign and internal policy regarding the issue of minorites has 
traditionally been inextricably tied to the Republic’s ideological perception of 
national identity. This official perception of Turkish nationality has led policy 
makers to force minorities through a tough Turkification process which 
disregards the realities of ethnic diversities, as well as and complimenting with 
the gradual social externalization of these minority groups. These programs have 
gone hand in hand with foreign policies which perceive the minorities as second 
rate citizens and have continuously played them as trump cards within the real-
political structure of the international arena. Such foreign policy has also been 
affective in both alienating the minority population and embedding within the 
psychology of the Turkish people a sense of national self-identity which 
welcomes and encourages this alienation at the individual level. Practices such 
as the Capital Tax, Population Exchange, the Events of 6-7th September, and the 
deportation of Rums are some of the historical events which tragically mark 
these processes, having become an unerasable part of our social memory in dire 
need of objective social analysis.
4ÖZET
Türkiye’deki azınlıkların hakları ve bu hakların idaresi çoğu zaman yoğun 
tartışmaların, siyasi farklılıkların ve toplumsal yargıların konusu olmuştur. Tüm 
bu ayırımlara rağmen azınlıklarla ilgili iç ve dış politika tüm dönemler içinde 
değişmez bir şekilde Cumhuriyet’in ideolojik milli kimlik anlayışına bağlı bir 
şekilde yürütülmüştür. Bu resmi ‘Türk milleti’ kavramı politikacıların 
azınlıkları, onların etnik farklılıklarının gerçeklerini de yok sayan,  zorlu bir 
Türkleşme sürecinden geçirmelerine ve  bu süreç içinde de azınlıkların 
dışlanmasına yol açmıştır. Bu programlar azınlıkları ikinci sınıf vatandaş olarak 
gören ve onları uluslararası arenanın reel-politiği içinde sürekli koz olarak 
kullanan dış politika uygulamaları ile el ele gitmiştir. Bu tarz dış politikalar 
azınlık nüfusunun dışlanmasının yanı sıra Türk insanın psikolojisinde de kişisel 
seviyede bu dışlanmayı benimseyen ve cesaretlendiren bir ulusal kimlik hissi 
oluşmasında da etkili olmuştur. Varlık Vergisi, Mübadele, 6-7 Eylül Olayları ve 
Rumların sınırdışı edilmesi gibi olaylar bu süreci işaretleyen tarihsel vakaların 
kimileri olmuştur, ve toplumsal hafızada silinmez bir yer etmelerine bağlı olarak 
tarafsız toplumsal analizlere muhtaçtır.
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6Preface
Before the initiation of this thesis project we were not aware that we were about to enter 
a phase within which minorities would dominate Turkey’s agenda.  Since 2003, largely 
motivated by the European Union process, issues like Armenian Genocide, the political and 
cultural rights of the Kurdish people, the Lausanne Treaty, the existence of other identities 
except Turkishness and minority foundations became more open to discussion. This 
atmosphere did not prevent individuals defending alternative views contradicting the official 
policy being labeled as ‘traitors’. 
There was, however, a somewhat significant development. Prime Ministry brought 
together a commission including intellectuals and academicians like Prof.Dr. Baskın Oran, 
and Prof.Dr.İbrahim Kaboğlu, which became known as the ‘minority commission’ (working 
under the Prime Ministry Human Rights Advisory Comitee). Their ensuing report caused 
reaction since for the first time there was an official document criticizing the state policy 
against minorities, the prevalent discrimination and how Turkey delicted the related articles of 
the Lausanne Treaty. The concept of Turkeyness instead of Turkishness was introduced. 
Kaboğlu and Oran were charged by the famous article of the Consitution, ‘301’ as well as the 
article '216'. They were branded as  serving the 'Sevres mentality', which supposedly aspires 
to divide Turkey and the Turkish nationality. They were even attacked physically by the Chief 
of KAMUSEN Bircan Akyıldız. Furthermore, the conference of the Armenian Genocide in 
2006, came under heavy pressure from the media and nationalist groups and the political 
machinery undertook to prevent the conference from happening at all. During the 301 trial of 
Orhan Pamuk, nationalist protestors across the Şişli Court House were carrying banners 
written “traitors: Orhan Pamuk, Murat Belge, Hrant Dink, Hasan Cemal, İsmet Berkan, Haluk 
Şahin”. Later, it became clear that this outspoken group did not present a weak minority, 
either in terms of power or capability. Soon enough, Priest Santoro, a local catholic priest 
serving in Trabzon, was murdered by a “16 year old boy”. This prophetic event did not attract 
much attention either by the media or the state and the case was closed. A year later in 
January 19, Hrant Dink, an outspoken Turkish Armenian intellectual and reporter, who had 
become the name for compromise and peace in Turkey, was shockingly killed by a "17 year 
old boy." After all the dust was settled, all that was left was pain, fear,  anger, and finally and 
most strongly, shame. 
7Today all the intellectuals labeled as traitors in the placards above mentioned are 
receiving life-threats. Nationalism is gaining popular stronghold day by day, perhaps with the 
aid of the rise of unemployment and economic disadvantages. But if poverty is a useful 
excuse, what about the use of nationalist discourse by the political parties calling themselves 
'social democrats' and which are naturally supposed to be more democratic and socially 
cohesive.
The paranoia called “External powers” once again seems to defeat a nation’s 
sensibilities and foresight. Never till now, the voice of a killer has become so loud (with the 
slogan of “Hepimiz Ogün Samastız” claimed by large sections of the population, Ogün 
Samast being Hrant Dink's murderer) This thesis project is humbly dedicated to the ones who 
carry the will to live together alongside and claiming all our differences and those who 
preserve the hope and belief in it.
8Introduction
There are silences in every nation’s history that underlie an active effort to forget. 
Turkish nationalist historiography is distinguished by the enormous effort to negate the 
previous existence of non-Turkish populations in the land that eventually became Turkey1. 
The history of the Turkish Republic has frequently witnessed the persecution and forced 
assimilation of these “others” within its national boundaries. On the other hand, only when 
minorities were considered as a source of wealth and profit, have they been kept/protected by 
the state.  In any case, the central population has at all times regarded the non-Muslim 
minority2 as the ‘guest’ or even ‘second-rate citizens’. ‘When the time is ripe, they will 
obediently leave the lands they inhabited never truly owned by them. As with all nationalist 
policies born out of discrimination between ‘us and them’, one can comfortably make the 
argument that both the past and the future of the non-Muslim community has affectively been 
usurped
According to Turkey’s official description, there are no minorities in Turkey, with the 
exception of those who were mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty: Orthodox Greeks and 
Armenians, and Jews. However, if one looks at the text of the Lausanne Treaty it will become 
clear that there is no specific mention of any national origin as Turkey suggests. In the Treaty, 
there is a reference only to non-Muslims. Turkey’s definition of the concept of minority is, 
therefore, extremely arbitrary and has no legal basis. As a result of this narrow definition 
Suryanis, Kheldanis, Nasturis and Turkish Protestants have been excluded from the legal 
arena. Muslim ethnic groups like Kurds and Alevis keep distance to the term ‘minority’ as 
they prefer to be regarded as the ‘essential subjects’, who fighted together with Sunni Turks in 
the Independence War and played fundamental role in the founding of the Turkish Republic. 
Therefore the position of Kurds and Alevis is controversial within the context of the term 
‘minority’ and remained out of the scope of this study. Besides, despite the secularist policy 
and citizenship-based nationalistic expressions in constitution, non-Muslims are always 
                                                            
1 Çağlar Keyder, “Consequences of the Exchange”, in (ed.) Renee Hirschon, Crossing The Aegean, Berghahn Books, 
Oxford, pp.39-53
2 The concept of ‘minority’ has been used in the world since from the 16th century to the present day.When the form 
of government -‘absolute monarchy’ was founded and when, approximately in the same
period, religious minorities came into being such as Protestants in Catholic monarchies and Catholics in Protestant 
monarchies, it became necessary for these minorities to be mutually protected and only then did the
9treated as suspiciously and second-rate and. Nationalist political elites kept their pre-republic 
memory alive, particularly against Rums and Armenians. Their dominance in economy and 
trade disturbed the republican elites and press, since they were considered as a ‘foreign hand’ 
that takes all benefits of Turkish economy and lives in better conditions compared to the real 
owners of the country who heroically struggled to defend the homeland against the colonialist 
enemies. In this sense, the Turkification policy may seem ironic but it should be beared in 
mind that this policy is mostly used to make non-Muslim’s lives insufferable and make them 
leave.
In ‘The History of Madness”, Foucault3 explains how society produces the specific 
forms of exteriorization and the manner in which the “different” is ousted. The different, the 
other, is inside but estranged, and is therefore “ignored.” In all forms of nationalism, 
ideological, cultural and ethnical identities derived out of an “us-them” opposition, the other 
is traditionally forced to silence and in typical manner stripped forcefully of its history. 
National identity, strives to define itself while defining and at times producing the other, but 
in it’s ego-centrism, it’s appearance of history, culture, language, religion etc. is made more 
pronounced while the other becomes more transparent. Moments of societal crisis tend to dig 
up this transparent form and give it back a warped sense of self, since its own unity depends 
again on the enmity of the other as defined by the center. 
 In “Beyond Orientalism”, Dallmayr4 mentions the various modes of relationships 
arising out of the meeting of different cultures. A specifically unequal meeting marks 
minorities within the nation-state with the majority. Some of the modes mentioned by 
Dallmayr such as conquest, oppression, assimilation, misrecognition, obedience or 
annihilation are stamped upon the nature of these interactions. At best, the other is 
kept/protected within the framework of a source of wealth and profit for “me”, as has at times 
been the case for the Jewish minorities in Turkey. 
The surfacing of nationalism even in its anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist discourse 
has tended to assault the freedom of “others.” The post-colonialist practice tends to emphasize 
this kind of aggression as the newly born nation-state after gaining its independence and 
celebrating its nationalism fails to empathize with its subjects in complete lack of the memory 
of its own dependent history. This proves to be the case for Turkish Republic as well. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
concept of minority emerge. After 1789, the concept of national minority was to be added to that of religious 
minorities
3 Michel Foucault (1995) “Madness and Civilization”, Routhledge, London
4 Fred Dallmayr (1996) “Beyond Orientalism”, New York Press, New York
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Kemalist nation-state project, which designed to place Turkey within contemporary Western 
civilization, does not generically exclude a nationalistic agenda that is potentially assimilative 
and discriminative. This question maintains its significance even today: Is Turkey the name of 
a state within which organization of people in various ethnicities and languages live, or a 
national signifier for ‘Turks’? The paradox is emphasized by the ambiguity of the ever-
pronounced official statement “Blessed is one who calls him/herself a Turk.” Since the 
founding of the Republic, the prevailing mentality underlining the idea that “The Turks are 
the true benefactors of Anatolia”, has evaded the official history and national education of the 
country. Among the most dramatic products of this line of thought one cannot help bringing 
to mind the Armenian deportation in 1915, during which hundred thousands of Armenians 
reputedly died ‘on the road’; The Capital Tax Levy5 specifically executed for minorities 
during the WWII era, run amidst a wave of anti-Semitic national sentiment, the Events of 6-7 
September, the Events in Maras in 1979, known as the Alevi- Sunni conflict, the 
coloquiallised verbalization of ethnic accusations/humiliations towards Kurds or Armenians 
as well as many other incidences and instances of minority alienation. All of these points out 
to a reality beyond that limited to ethnic-discrimination periodically flamed by radical groups. 
One needs to go back to the elements of our national foundation to analyze more deeply its 
practices and principles at the possible expense of a presumed political innocence.
Rıdvan Akar6 mentions how the contradiction between the characteristics of Turkish 
national identity and the presence of a non-Muslim minority constitute the bases of applied 
policies. This process of blessing and praising the Turk is brandished by Sun-language 
theories, and everyday campaigns of “Citizen, speak Turkish!” In the words of Akar, when it 
comes to “work”, the 1932 law (2007) has effectively banned foreigners to work virtually in 
any field.  For those with capital, a policy of “handing over commerce to the Muslim-Turk” 
has been put to effect. The Capital Tax of 1942-44 aims at stripping minority capital of its 
property ownership and at the same time nourishing the newly budding Turkish bourgeoisie. 
In its practical applications, as was the case with the exchange, these measures have been 
founded on religious and not ethnic difference. 70% of the 185 million Lira tax obtained in 
Istanbul has been paid by Armenian, Rum and Jewish citizens, although they constituted no 
more than 21% of the population in the city.  
                                                            
5 Varlık Vergisi
6 Rıdvan Akar, “Bir Bürokratın Kehaneti ya da ‘Bir Resmi Metin’den Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi” Birikim vol.110, 
1998, pp.68
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According to Bali7, the greatest damage of Capital Tax Levy was the uprooting of trust 
at a time when the Turkification policies of minorities begun in 1923 had slowly paved the 
way for an easier settlement among the minorities and the Single Party regime was beginning 
to gradually earn their confidence. Not to mention the fact that the incident became a constant 
reminder that non-Muslims are and can be treated as “second-rate citizens” as far as the public 
and political powers were concerned. The 37th and 42nd Clauses of the Lausanne Treaty 
placed under international guarantee a social equilibrium for the minorities, which resembled 
their life under the Ottoman regime. Within this arrangement, minorities hoped for the 
continuation of preserving their own cultural identity, social order, and language in a fashion 
similar to their century fold existence in the area. But the new Republic was resolved to melt 
all ethnic elements under the principle of a “single language-single ideal- single culture” thus 
creating a national identity for the nation-state. 
Above all, non-Muslim minorities have been used as a trump card in the state’s dirty 
play called ‘real politics’. Whenever those states wanted to suppress the power of the counter 
state and ‘persuade’ them in the negotiation tables, they used their own citizens. This is so 
valid in Turkish-Greek affairs in relation to the practices on both Rum minority in Turkey and 
Muslim minority in Western-Thrace, Greece. In both cases, the past, today and the future of 
the ‘other’ were plundered, sometimes by arbitrary exchange and sometimes by state-
organized mass-attacks like 6-7 September’s. This study aimed to shed a small light on these 
kind of shameful and hurtful processes. Rather than the past, ways of history-teaching 
refreshes the externalizing binaries between communities and countries. Therefore, learning 
of the true history’s common victims of state policy will bring the later generations closer. 
That would be a reliable factor for them to not repeat the similar mistakes of the formers.
As to methods of research, qualitative research methods are basically applied in this 
study. Primary resources are used especially in the first part; applied to theories of 
nationalism. Since this is a research of historical subject, literature survey is the main applied 
method. Among evaluated data are articles, magazines, books and newspapers of relevant 
dates. Discourse analysis is utilized for writings of politicians, thinkers and journalists of the 
early period of the Republic, as well as nationalist, discriminative speeches
                                                            
7 Rıfat Bali (1999) “Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni”, İletişim, İstanbul
12
“Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind.”
A. Einstein
I)The concept of “Nation” and the character of Turkish Nationalism
In determination of the elements that constitute a nation, the preferences of political 
power play a crucial role. Like in many other societies, nationalization is realised mostly by 
the will and efforts of the political elite in Turkey. Before evaluating the structure of Turkish 
nationalism, the main perceptions and approaches of nationalism help us to understand that 
Turkish case of nationalism does not have an unique or original building process. Even the 
style of using tools of political power and the evolution of the ideology are so likely with 
others such as German Nationalism. The main separation point in theories of nation derives 
from definition and characterisation of the concept; whether it is a political term or a cultural-
ethnic term.
Main Approaches to Nation
According to Eric Hobsbawm8, nation is human communities that in sufficient size of 
whom regard themselves as a member of a nation. This is the political definition of the term. 
But there are also psycological and cultural definitions that make the subject controversial. In 
psycological terms, a nation is a group of people distinguished by a shared loyalty or affection 
in the form of patriotism. People have the tendency to form groups in order to gain a sense of 
security, identity and belonging. Cultural definition states that nation is a group of people 
bound together by a common language, religion, history and traditions, although nations 
exhibit various levels of cultural heterogeneity. 
On the other hand, for Benedict Anderson, nation is an imagined political community 
with the members that are regardless of eachother, has never met and probably will be never 
met. Nations exist more as mental images than as genuine communities which require a level 
of face to face interaction to sustain the notion of a common identity9. If nations exist, they 
                                                            
8 Eric Hobsbawm (1996), “Aşırılıklar Çağı: Kısa 20. Yüzyıl: 1914-1991”, Sarmal Yayınları, İstanbul
9 Benedict Anderson (2001) “Imagined Communities” in (ed.) Vincent Pecora, Nations and Identities: Classic 
Readings, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.309–318
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exist as imagined artifices, constructed for us through education, mass media and a process of 
political socialisation. 
Ultimately, nations can only be defined subjectively by their members as it is a psyco-
political construct. As far as there is no ‘right’ definition for the term nation, we can consider 
on the various approaches of some thinkers. The idea that nations are political, not ethnic 
communities has been supported by a number of theorists of nationalism.  Hobsbawm is one 
of them and he states that nations are ‘invented traditions’. Rather than accepting modern 
nations have developed out of long-established ethnic communities, he argues that a belief in 
historical continuity and cultural purity is invariably a myth that is created by nationalism 
itself. Thus, nationalism creates nations, not the other way around. A widespread consciosness 
of nationhood did not develop until the late nineteenth century, but than reinforced by the 
invention of national anthems, flags and the extension of primary education.
Ernest Gellner emphasizes the link between nationalism and modernisation, in 
particular, the process of industrialisation10. He stresses that, while ‘premodern’ or 
‘agroliterate’ societies were structured by a network of feudal bonds and loyalties, emerging 
industrial societies promoted social mobility, self-striving and competiton, and so required a 
new source of cultural cohesion. This was provided by nationalism. However, Anthony Smith 
focuses on ‘etnie’ and challenged the idea of a link between nationalism and modernisation by 
highlighting the continuity between modern nations and premodern ethnic communities. Etnie 
is a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural 
elements, has a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity11.
For Smith, names are crucial, not only for self- and other- identification, but also as 
expressive emblems of the collective ‘personality’. Until a collective cultural identity receives 
a proper name, it lacks a recognizable sense of community. Second, the belief or myth of 
common ancestry (not some genetic heritage) is required. Ethnicity is not about blood or 
genes as such, but about beliefs in common origins. For the ethnic nationalists and their 
followers, the etnie is indeed a ‘super-family’- extended in space and time to distant relatives 
over many generations, including the yet unborn. The other important aspects for Smith are 
historical memories, shared culture including language, religion, dress, food, music, crafts and 
architecture, laws, customs and institutions. Also territory and solidarity- the sense of 
belonging to the community- are the other criterias for etnicity.
                                                            
10 Ernest Gellner (2001) “Nations and Nationalism”, Blackwell, Oxford
11 Anthony Smith (1999) “National Identity”, Penguin Books, London
14
For Guibernau12, language is the most important factor in the constitution of national 
consciousness. Press machines spreading by the late fiftinth century and the emergence of 
national monarchies are conributed to the formation of a united national language. Now on, 
the dominant classes, intellectuals, clergy and people were speaking the same language. Thus 
for Guibernau, language became the most important criteria for remaining within a nation. 
Above everything, the meaning of staying out of a nation was ‘to not understand’ and ‘not to 
be understood’. The basic problem of ‘being foreign’ is the inadequency of making 
communication and mother tongue is the symbol of the belonging to a community. Elie 
Kedourie13 also takes language as the most visible differentiating sign of national differences. 
Kedourie expresses that language is also cretion for the nation’s recognition and contuniation
of existence. A nation which speaks an original language has the right to establish a state. 
If a nation is primarily a political entity, it has an inclusive structure, in which 
membership is not restricted to those who fulfil particular language, religious, ethnic or 
suchlike criteria. But for unlike the territorial and civic versions of nationalism, ethnic 
nationalism conceives of the nation as a genealogical and vernacular cultural community. 
Whereas civic and territorial conceptions of the nation regard it as a community of common 
laws and territorial citizenship. Ethnic nationalism underlines the ‘otherness’ of the other and 
builts its own identity by this confrontation or conflict.
The idea of Etnicity-based nation can be traced back to late eighteenth-century 
Germany and the writings of figures such as Herder and Fichte. For Herder, the innate 
character of each national group was ultimately determined by its natural environment, 
climate and physical geography, which shaped the lifestyle, working habits, attitudes and 
creative tendencies of a people. But above all, he emphasised the importance of language, 
which he regarded as the embodiment of a people’s distinctive traditions and historical 
memories. So each nation possesses a “Volksgeist”14 which reveals itself in songs, myths and 
legends, and provides a nation with its source of creativity. Therefore, Herder’s nationalism 
contains a form of culturalism emphasizing an awareness and appreciation of national 
traditions and collective memories instead of a political quest for statehood. 
Herder’s approach had a profound impact on the awakening of national consciousness 
in nineteeth-century Germany, reflected in the rediscovery of ancient myths and legends. In 
                                                            
12 Montserrat Guibernau (1996) “Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 
Polity Press, Cambridge
13 Elie Kedorie (1960) “Nationalism”, Hutchinson Ltd., London
14 Volksgeist is the spirit of the people; the organic identity of a people reflected in their culture and particularly their 
language
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this sense, the nation-building process of Turkey and the nation idea at the mind of the 
political elite of the time had a very similar character with Herder’s and German15
nationalism. Like Turkey, Germany gives an independent character to state. There is no 
understanding of a state that serves for people but a state that demands unquestionable 
obedience as we see in Ficte, Hegel and Luther’s writings. Cultural unity is more important 
than the political unity. German nationalism took “volk”as base, refused universalism and was 
close to particularism.
Tanıl Bora states that ideology of nationalism has formed the most totalitarian project 
of determinist, absolutist, destructive practices against the liberation which it’s own self 
promised16. Recording democracy with ‘national sovereignty’ and cautions for maintaining 
state existence was the greatest obstacle for further democratization. Nationalism, the most 
decomposing and purifiying ideology of modernism, make someone feel like home as it gives 
people a home while it takes the home of neighboors and does not behave hospitable. 
The Character of Turkish (official) Nationalism
According to the nationalism typology of Anthony Smith, there are two kinds; first, 
the territory or citizenship-based Western-European nationalism and second the etnhnic-origin 
based or culture-history- language based Eastern-European type of nationalism17. In latter 
one, national identity stays at the center and has tendency to melt the citizen/ individual 
within the national collective subject. It has potential to take all kinds of minorities, 
aggressively under pressure and it is open to autoritarian-fascist expansions. 
A similar model of Ernest Renan mentiones the ‘French-style’ and the ‘German-style’ 
of nationalism. The French-style defines nation at the level of the common will of people and 
takes its legitimacy from that will.  But Renan argues that French-style of nationalism does 
not have a democratic structure as it seems. In spite of being a unity of the people who gives a 
daily quite plebisite, nation is the hegemonic form that controls the obligatory result of that 
quite plebisite and changes it to an automatic mode.
                                                            
15 In Germany, the nation is builded within long time and with great performences such as providing a mutual culture 
and utilisizing myths. This nation-building process required an autoritive structure; The tradition comes with 
Bismarck,Weimar Republic and in Third Reich,continues in pro-war Germany. State has no deal to gain legitimacy 
toward the citizens but citizens have to obey. 
16 Tanıl Bora (1995) “Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı”, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp.15
17 Smith:1995
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Turkish nationalism contains all of these types. Kemalist nationalism can be 
interprieted in a way as both race-based, irredentist and as peaceful, focusing on citizenship. 
Taha Parla stresses the tension between the Kemalist nationalism’s ethnic-cultural plurality 
with defensive legal face and chauvinist- aggressive face that is based on superior national 
character. Carl Schmitt,  determines that all of the basic concepts of modern state doctirines 
are the ‘secularised teological’ concepts. Since, Turkish nation state has the divine discourse 
of ‘national interest’ and self-sacrification of the indiviual for the national purpose, the 
statement of Schmitt becomes more meaningful to us. In Ziya Gökalp’s synthesis based on 
cultural identity18, there is a sensitive balance between territorial-based nationalism that is 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the approach that points the eternal existency and 
uniqueness of nation. Ayhan Aktar argues that Gökalp’s idea of individual’s ties to the 
national community being along cultural and therefore civic lines was left its place to an 
ethnic definition tailored by the republican elite19. 
The state-centered character of official nationalism is first of all a result of the nation-
building process. The over-consumption of nation- state symbols in public life such as the 
Turkish National Anthem, picture of Atatürk, flag, crescent and star, is partly the product of 
the tight control of state on civil society.  Army plays the crucial role in re-producing official 
nationalism. The ideology of being apprehensive against external threats and automatic 
perception of enemies are internalized. Furthermore, Turkish Army Forces, by identifying 
itself with Mustafa Kemal’s personality of ‘state-founder soldier’, regards itself as the real 
owner and representative of nationalism. Çağlar Keyder20 indicates that compared with the 
late Ottoman state, the republican state was much less accountable, therefore more autocratic 
and arbitrary. Society was in a much weaker position in terms of the legal framework 
protecting it from the state.  For Suavi Aydın21 nationalism has three basic targets; First, to 
create a national economy, second, nationalizing the executive and political organization and 
taking the local differences under control of this organization and third, creation of a national 
culture and a new form of belonging that is called loyalty. The dominant political apparatus, 
media and the academy in Turkey, have inclination to accept nationalistic patterns in 
                                                            
18 For Gökalp, nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary group or association but it is a group 
composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in 
language, religion, morality and aesthetics. Ziya Gökalp (1968) “Türkçülüğün Esasları”, Varlık, Istanbul
19 Ayhan Aktar (2000),“Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları”, İletişim, İstanbul 
20 Çağlar Keyder, “Consequences of the Exchange”, in (ed.) Renee Hirschon, Crossing The Aegean, Berghahn Books,
Oxford
21 Suavi Aydın (1998) “Kimlik Sorunu, Ulusallık ve Türk Kimliği”, Öteki Yayınevi, Ankara
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evaluating the social conflicts and events. Through this nationalist vision, official-history 
never takes the subjective experiences, biographies of the other as data. 
Büşra Ersanlı Behar, in her work “Power and History”, qualifies history-writing and 
teaching as the most vital and permanent element of a society’s mind-map22. Like in many  
other countries, in Turkey, history-writing23 is used for political purposes, especially to create 
a national consciousness. This is the cultural front of the Kemalist Revolution. Ersanlı defends 
that, the biggest harm of the Sun- Language Theory (Güneş-Dil Teorisi) beyond creating an 
ethnic superiority, was to legitimize an understanding of an history that was restricted by 
political power. By this way, Pan-Turkism also survived in the emphasis which the so-called 
Turkish History Thesis placed on the origin of the Turks in Central Asia and their alleged role 
in establishing civilization through out the world. With the new republic, historians were 
regarded as the founders of a nation-state and the ‘political mission’ came before the 
‘scientific study’. For example, Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), was a sociologist, linguist and a 
social historian and he used positive science for modern nationalist aims. For him, Turkism 
was to ‘bring the subconcious to the conscious’. So, before binding the Ottoman and Western 
values to each other, the Turkish ethnic-cultural identity- which was claimed as existing 
before as a cultural entity- should be refreshed. Later, this approach took its permanent place 
in the party programme of Republican People’s Party (RPP). Political elites, stipulated an 
unshakeable homogenity in the thoughts of Turkish intellectuals for a strong nationalism. The 
most determinant step was to eliminate all of the elite opposition groups which continued for 
twenty years (1919–1937) and did not remained at the level of thoughts but occured at 
radically harsh. It owed its ‘legitimacy’ to the military triumph. So this kind of nationalism 
was an extreme example where the masses remained silent partners, while the modernising 
elite did not attempt to accomodate popular sentiment within the nationalist discourse. Rather 
than being an ideology Kemalism was a very rigid politics which was taken as the ‘only true’ 
idea in all cultural, economic, political fronts. Policy against the minorities took its share from 
that authoritarian governance practice. 
                                                            
22 Büşra Ersanlı Behar (1993) “İktidar ve Tarih, Afa Yayınları, İstanbul
23 In the classbook of 1936, called“ History for the second education” it is argued that in examination of social history, 
to search the racial and linguistic features of human communities to distinct them, is essential. Race is defined as the 
similar persons having same blood and similar physical structures. Book gave place to Gobineau’s classification of 
colors and supported it by the headbone classification of Eugene Pittard. For the classification of language, Turkish 
was defended as the primary and crucial language among the all other world languages.
“The Turkish race that created the greatest events of history, is the most self-protected race.” It is claimed that altough 
it mixed with the neighboor races around, it did not lose original character and remained as before. 
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A) The Position of Minorities During the Ottoman Empire
In the Ottoman Empire, the essential classification- political, social, even economic-
was based on Muslim, Djimmi (Zimmi) and Harbi division. This tripartite distinction between 
the believer, the subjugated unbeliever and the hostile unbeliever was far more important than 
such divisions as Turks, Greeks, Slavs, Persians or Arabs. Bernard Lewis24 argued that the 
loyalty to a place existed, but it was to a village or quarter, at most to a province, not a
country. Loyalty to one’s kin was ancient and potent but it was to the family or tribe, not to 
the nation. The ultimate loyalty, the measure by which a human distinguished between brother 
and stranger, was religion. As in most Islamic fiscal laws, there were discriminatory rates of 
assessment. The Ottoman Codes recognized these rates as the lowest for Muslims, the highest 
for Harbis (Non- Muslims in the lands of war) and a medium rate for Djimmis. The believer, 
the hostile infidel, the subject infidel- were the three recognized categories and nationality, 
even political allegiance, for Lewis, had no bearing on them.
The Millet System
The institutional structure and perception of the society in Ottoman Empire was based 
on ‘Millet System25’ that classifies the communities according to their religion or religious 
sect. The millet system was in effect, an extension of Ottoman general administrative 
practices. In an age that lacked modern technologies of administration, communication and 
control, the Ottomans like other contemporary states, had little choice but to deal with the 
masses of their population corporatively.26 Other than the certain areas of great importance to 
state such as security and taxation, they generally adopted a policy of laissez-faire in the
internal affairs of communities. In Ottoman Empire, the millet was not a homogeneous entity, 
there were four vertical cross sections27; Jews, Armenians, Orthodox Christians, and Muslims.
The millet system has a long history in the Middle East, and is closely linked to Islamic rules 
on the treatment of non-Muslim minorities. The Ottoman term specifically refers to the 
separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule 
                                                            
24 Bernard Lewis, (1998) “The Emergence of Modern Turkey”, Oxford Universty Press
25 The word millet, from the Arabic milla, means religion and the name used in the Koran. It was later extended to 
mean religious community, especially the community of Islam
26 Avner Levi (1994) “The Jews of the Ottoman Empire”, N.J.Darwin Press, Princeton, p.17 
27 Beside the main millets of the Greek Orthodox, Jewish and Armenians, a wide array of other groups such as 
Catholics, Karaites and Samaritans were also represented, whereas others, which were seen as deviant forms of Islam, 
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themselves. Just how extensive was the autonomy enjoyed by the minority Christian and 
Jewish communities in the early days of the empire remains a matter of dispute, but there is 
no doubt that as time passed they came to enjoy the strong sense of corporate identity 
traditionally associated with the Millet System.
Each millet was under the supervision of an ‘ethnarch’ ('milletbaşı’), most often a 
religious hierarch such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul), who 
reported directly to the Ottoman Sultan. Ortodox Patriarchate ruling over the Millet-i Rum, in 
fact incorporated all the Ortodox Christian subjects of the sultan, including Serbs, Romanians, 
Bulgarians, Vlachs, Albanians and Arabs.The members of millet carried out their relationship 
with state by the agency of ethnarch. Millet system was ordered by the principles of the 
İslamic public law- called ‘Sharia’. Thus, Non-Muslim citizens had the right to live inside the 
borders of the Islamic State as ‘dhimmi’. This right included protection of life, property and 
honour but also meant to be taken under state services.
For community, to gain the dhimmi status, a treaty between the community and the 
Islamic State was compulsory. After accepting the Islamic sovereignty and paying the taxes of 
‘Harac’ and ‘Jizya’ (Cizye), communities could become dhimmi. In return of their loyalty to 
the Empire, they could set their own laws, collected and distributed their own taxes. In this 
way, the protection of Islamic khalife was maintained and the rights and obligations were 
quaranteed. When a member of one millet committed a crime against a member of another, 
the law of the injured party applied, but the ruling Islamic majority being superior, any 
dispute involving a Muslim fell under their sharia-based law. In court, testimony of a Muslim 
would always be accepted over that of a non-Muslim. Marriages between Muslims and non-
Muslims were illegal. Unsurprisingly, Muslims were privileged and non-Muslim Turks were 
also treated as ‘minority’.
Dhimmis were relatively free and autonomous in ordering their religious and social 
life. Non-Muslims had the freedom of worship and ceremony, immunity of worship places 
and had autonomy in education, communication, social security, health and charity. Each 
millet kept its own courts, schools, and welfare system. Members of the millet even built 
roads, water fountains, and communal buildings for their own neighborhoods. Regulations of 
marriage, inheritance and bequest were in the hand of their own institutions. Although the 
Ottoman State did not directly and harshly pursue a policy of forced individual conversion28, 
it did decree that, for reasons of outward distinction, the people of the different millets wear 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
such as Shi'as, Alavis, and Yezidis, had no official status and were generally considered to be part of the Muslim 
millet.
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specific colors of, for instance, turbans and shoes. They could not dress like a Muslim, could 
not ride a horse, walk with clog in Turkish bath and could not have a higher house than a 
Muslim’s29. Furthermore, non-Muslim men who came to the military age must pay the tax of 
“Cizye”.
According to the principles of modern democracies, toleration means the absence of 
discrimination. In that sense, for Bernard Lewis, the old Ottoman Empire was not tolerant30, 
as non-Muslims were not civic and social equals of the followers of the dominant faith, they 
were subject to a number of legal disabilities. But since complete toleration is new and 
insecure even in the most ‘enlightened’ modern democracies, it would hardly be reasonable to 
look for it in the Ottoman Empire. Lewis defends that if we define toleration as the absence, 
not of discrimination, but of persecution, then the Ottoman record until the late nineteeth 
century is excellent.
From the time of Murad I through the 17th century, the Ottoman State also put into 
effect the ‘Devşirme System’, a policy of filling the ranks of the Ottoman army and 
administrative system by means of forcefully collecting young Christian boys from their 
families and taking them to the capital for education and an eventual career either in the 
Janissary military corps or, for the most gifted, the Ottoman administrative system. Most of 
the children thus collected were from the empire's Balkan territories, where the devshirme 
system was referred to as the "blood tax". The children themselves were not forcefully 
converted to Islam although they ended up becoming Muslim, due to the circle in which they 
were raised.
There were differences in the positioning of millets. Ortodoxs were the largest and 
most influential community till the Mora Rebellions (1821). The priviledged position of 
Rums31 started with the period of Fatih Sultan Mehmet. The head of the Orthodox Millet was 
the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. The fact that the Orthodox Church was ruled by a 
single hand was the main reason for their advantage. Greek was the semi-official language, 
furthermore there had been firmans in Greek language. Rums in Phanar (Fener) were largely 
employed by the state bureucracy. The first important problem occured in 1657, when the 
Patriarch III. Parthenios was executed by the reason of ‘motivating Constantin Sherban, the 
Wallachian Voyvoda, to rebellion’. Although Patriarch V.Grigorios excommunicated the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
28 The Sabetai Sevi event was an exception
29 Bilal Eryılmaz, (1992) “Nation System in Ottoman Empire”, Ağaç Yayınları, İstanbul
30 Bernard Lewis, “The Emergence of Modern Turkey”, Oxford Universty Press, 1998 
31 I used both Rum and Greek, athough the Rums see Greece as their kin-state, they believe that they can trace their 
lineage directly back to Romano-Byzantine Constantinople (Alexis Alexandris, “The Greek Minority of Istanbul and 
Greek-Turkish Relations”,1983)
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members of Ethnik-i Eterya and told not to war against the state, he was also executed for 
having a connection with the rebellion. That ‘connection’ could not been proved, moreover 
the Patriarch behaving conservative, did not interested with the movements of independence 
so he was declared as ‘traitor’32. He was hanged with his formal clothes on, in the middle door 
of the Patriarchate. Later the independence movement of Greek’s would effect the Fener 
Greek Patriarchate as they had the belief in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and gave 
great importance to Istanbul. When Smryna (İzmir) invaded by Greece, patriarchs blessed the 
forces. That attitude would later caused a general and widespread thought of Rums as 
‘traitor’within society.
The position of Armenians who were known as the loyal community (Millet-i Sadıka) 
were also important in the Empire, they gained crucial seats after a degration in the status of 
Rums occurred. But than a negative change began with the Russian conquest of the Caucasus 
in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and the creation of a Russian Armenia on the 
Eastern border of Ottoman Empire, where the Armenian Church was established and where 
Armenian governors and generals ruled provinces and commanded armies.
According to Yusuf Besalel33, in general, hostility against dhimmis was intensifed on 
the Christians, Jews were less subjected to the bad-look of Turkish-Muslim people. Because 
as İlber Ortaylı points, religiously Muslims were not anti-semitic. Jewish Community was 
easy to rule, did not cause trouble except the Sabetai Sevi and the converts. The widespread 
practices that had occured in Jewish history like massacres, plunders, cultural domination and 
arbitrary executions had not too much take place in Ottoman Empire.34 But at the end of 19th 
century, the zionist movement disturbed the Empire as the “Promised Lands” in Tewrat called 
for migration and those lands were inside the borders of the Ottoman Empire. In return of an 
establishment of the Jewish State within Empire, capital, technological and economic 
development was promised. There were two choices for the Jewish people, whether they 
would integrated to the country and society they were included, or they would participate to 
the efforts of establishing a state in Palestine and if necessary they would migrate there. 
Majority of Jews did not prefer the second choice. II. Abdulhamid rejected the offer of 
zionists35 and took serious precautions to prevent Jews to settle in Palestine. For example, red 
                                                            
32 M.Çağatay Okutan, (2004)“Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları”, Bilgi Üni. Yayınları, pp.56
33 Okutan: 2004 pp.57
34 There had been some arbitrary executions of some Jewish persons during IV Murat’s Period.
35 Theodo Herzl, a leading Zionist activist, approached Abdul Hamid on several occasions, offering to regulate the 
whole finances of Empire and pay off the Ottoman national debt in return for a grant of land in Palestine
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passports were given to the Jews that arrived Palestine and these Jews were no more treated as 
Ottoman citizen (Tebaa). 
During the power of İttihad and Terakki, this application ended and the Jews gained 
permission to buy land. Moreover, Zionists opened an office in Istanbul, newspapers 
advocating the creation of a Jewish Colony appeared there about same time. Tarık Zafer 
Tunaya argued that the reason for this detente was the belief in Jewish satisfaction of the need 
of foreign capital and technology36. Especially after the ‘Bab-ı Ali Coup’, the Empire entered 
a serious financial crises. For many people, Jews could be the solution at that time. Thus a 
Jewish- Muslim solidarity was supported by the Union and Progress Party (Ittihad ve Terakki) 
In the 19th century the problem caused by Ottoman Empire was called as “East 
Question” in the public opinioun of Western states. All the conservatives, liberals, and 
socialists used the same term. But for conservatives, it was the problem of ‘sharing’ the 
Ottoman Empire, whereas for liberals and socialists it was the problem of the salvation of the 
suppressed nations. In 17 and 18th Centuries, Armenians got important positions in Eastern 
trade as they were supported by Persians. At the same period Russians supported Rums in 
trade. European bourgeoise needed Rums for a developed maritime trade network. Thus 
Rums were started to be under the protection of Western States. This protection brought the 
problem of interfering in domestic matters of the Ottomans. Consequently, Armenians and 
Rums were being used for the political and economic interests of the Great Powers. On the 
other hand, having such relationship with Europe introduced non-muslims with the idea of 
nationalism. 
The Tanzimat Period
The task of reforming (Westernising) the Ottoman system of government was 
undertaken mainly by Sultan Abdulmedjid (1839–61) and a series of reforming grand viziers, 
Reshid, Ali, Fuad and Midhat. In a series of reforms known collectively as the ‘Tanzimat’ a 
new system of central government was introduced, based on the Western model; and a 
reformed system of provincial administration. New schools, new system of law, commercial, 
penal and civil were set up based on the Western model. Moreover, in 1839 and 1856 imperial 
rescripts were issued, promising respect for life, honour and property of the subject, reforming 
the tax system, regular and orderly recruitment of the armed forces, fair public trial of persons 
accused, and equality before law, irrespective of race or religion. 
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By the 1839 Firman (Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun), it was determined that the immunity 
of life, property, honour, house would be provided. The equality of all subjects from all 
religions was taken as a basic principle. For the first time, the principle of that everyone 
would benefit from same rights and guarantees (particularly in personal rights, punishment 
and tax law) entered to the area of positive law. But this principle took negative reaction. İlber 
Ortaylı emphasizes that besides the ‘conservative Muslims’, also Greek-Ortodox Church did 
not have the inclination to accept the equality of all subjects37. The reason was the possibility 
of the development of other religious sects and Jews. As a matter of fact, Phanar Patriarchate 
had spiritual, financial and legal dominance on people living in the European land of empire. 
But with this firman, dominance came to the end. As nationality became a more significant 
factor than religion in determining identity, the Ortodox community split38, largely along 
ethnic lines. After a short time, the Bulgarian Spiritual Center (Bulgar Daire-i Ruhaniye) was 
founded, than the efforts increased to establish the National Bulgarian Church. The main 
purpose of the Firman was the unity of all subjects living in the borders of the Empire. 
Devotion to the dynasty and the ideology of unity in a form of Ottoman patriotism- proto-
nationalism- were supplied to the bounded millets. But the project could not be succesful. 
In 1846, Sultan Abdülmedjit (1839–61) explained that "It was wrong to make 
discrimination although we live together in the same country” and for the first time in an 
Islamic State an emphasis was made about the requirement of separating relious matters and 
political rights. The will of sultan took its place in the 1856 ‘the Islahat Firman’ and two of 
third of the firman was about the non-Muslims. For Bülent Tanör, this situation was about the 
external pressure. Western States realised that the promises given with the 1839 Firman had 
not been kept, so before the Paris Convention (1856), they demanded new regulations for 
non-Muslims as the price of defending Ottomans against Russian Empire and the acceptance 
of Ottomans to the family of European States. But according to Ortaylı, giving of some 
autonomy and rights to the millets were the prolongation of the political tradition of 19th 
century. In conclusion, as Çağlar Keyder39 states, while state modernisation was in part a 
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37 İlber Ortaylı (1986) “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Millet”, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol:IV, 
İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
38 In the 1930s the Patriarchate was forced to accept the de facto autonomy of the Serbian church, and a shortly 
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Exarchate and an autocephalus church in Albania were created. As for the Armenian Patriarchate and the Chief 
Rabbinate, they never enjoyed the power enjoyed by their Greek counterpart, but they remained nonetheless significant 
as symbols of the autonomy enjoyed by their communities, an autonomy extended in 1830 to the Armenian Catholics.
39 Okutan: 2004: pp.64
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response by the political elite to international pressures, it was also carried out in an attempt to 
centralise and hence strenghten the empire.
The Islahat Firman confirmed the rights given by the 1839 Firman. Besides, new rules 
about the internal regulations of relious communities setted up. Now on, the secular power of 
patriarch would be shared with the community members and secular assemblies would be 
founded. Thus the authority that was originated from the absolute religious and secular 
hegemony of Patriarch was restricted. Children of dhimmis did not have to go to the 
community schools, now on, they could go to all schools including the military schools. The 
purpose of social and political equality was underlined by the principles that provide the non-
muslims to be employed in state service and represented in local assemblies. It was expressed 
that as the natural result of gaining equal rights, non-Muslims would also be equal in 
obligations and would equally serve for military (first in 1909). Thus dhimmis were 
transferred to the citizen status. However, this status did not make them happy but make them 
restless as now, the religious elite had to share its power and the community members had to 
be soldier.
The Islahat Firman with its many regulations, contributed to the alienation of 
communities from the center. Thus the idea of a single Ottoman nation could not been 
transferred to the practice as some of the non-Muslim and non-Turk communities went to 
their own and seperate way. Moreover, for Ziya Gökalp, the Firman motivated the national 
feelings of the communities. On the other hand for A.L. Macfie40, Ottoman Muslims for the 
most part refused to acknowledge the principle of equality on which the reforms were based, 
prefferring instead to stick to the old order, based on the principle of Muslim supremacy 
enshrined in the Sheriat. 
In 1862 the Greek Regulation (Nizamname), in 1863 the Armenian Regulation and in 
1865 the Jewish Regulation which were attributed as a ‘constitution’ by the Western States 
and those communities were legislated. These regulations were all prepared in the millet’s 
own commisions and approved by Babıali. Basic principle was realising the governance of 
communities by its own members and decreasing the efficiency of religious elites. So these 
non-Muslim individuals were participating to the governance and this feeded the sense of 
belonging to a distinct nation. 
The Ottoman rule was in a paradox, in one hand they satisfied the national feelings of 
these communities by giving them priviledges, on the other hand, Ottomans expected loyalty 
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in return of the equality principle41. With the Province Regulation in 1864, non-Muslims were 
permitted to have seat (by election) in the Civil Administration Assemblies (Mülki İdare 
Meclisi). With the Firman of Justice (1875) all subjects become equal in every matter and 
facilitate opening new schools of non- Muslims.
Mithat Pasha (vizier), who was constant to shift power from the Palace to the Sublime 
Porte42 , the central office of the Ottoman goverment also wanted to prevent further Great 
Power intervention in the Domestic affairs of the empire. Based on Belgian, French and 
Prussian Constitutions, he proclaimed a constitution. The new constitution was known as the 
“Mithat Pasha Constitution” and promulgated on December 23, 1876 Now on the effective 
power would be placed in the hands of a council of ministers, appointed by the sultan, and 
legislative power in the hands of a chamber of deputies that elected indirectly by the people, 
and a senate, appointed by the sultan. Neverthless, the sovereignty would in principle remain 
with the sultan. To gain popular support for the new order, ideology of Ottomanism43 was 
promoted expecting an identification with a new entity of the Ottoman nation instead of 
millets of Greek, Armenian or Muslim. 
The Despotic Rule of Abdulhamid
In 1878, II. Abdulhamid, proclaimed sultan in the midst of the Eastern Crisis, taking 
advantage of the mood of national humiliation and despair that defeat in the war against 
Russia had evoked. So this enabled him, not only to suspend the constitution and send the 
chamber of deputies packing, but also to reassert the traditional authority of the sultan, 
recently undermined by the Tanzimat reforms. The regime created despotism and reaction, 
was to last for more than 30 years. The policies adopted by Abdulhamid in the remaining 
years of his reign were based on the absolute sovereignty of the sultan and the supremacy of 
the Muslim Millet. 
First, assisted by the paraphernalia of a police state, he endeavoured to prevent the 
spread of western, liberal, secular and nationalist values, particularly those associated with 
constitutional and political reform. Second, he tried to reassert the essentially Islamic 
character of the empire. Emphasis was given to a revitalisation of the caliphate and pan-
                                                            
41At that time there was still hope for the Ottoman Unity but with the Balkan Wars everything has changed 
42 The Sublime Porte was consisted of the office of the grand vizier, the ministry of foreign affairs and the council of 
state.
43 The state did not seek to homogenise the population in the name of a single ethnic, confessional or linguistic 
affiliation. The subjects were free to construct and define their identities within the bounds of their religious 
communities.
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Islamic policies were promoted, aimed to stimulate opposition to the advance of the great 
imperial powers (Britain, France, Russia) and secure the liberation of the enslaved Muslim 
peoples of the world. But he could not for ever stop the tide of liberal, secular and nationalist 
ideas, already in full flood in the Balkans. 
By the way, in Eastern Anatolia, Armenian nationalists organised by Henchak, set up 
by Armenian students in Geneva in 1887, and by Dashnaksutiun – the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation- ordered campaigns calling for independence or autonomy. As a 
result between 1894–96, by the Hamiddiyye- Kurdish cavalry set up by Abdulhamid- and 
local raiders, a massacre of Armenians occurred in the eastern provinces and also in Istanbul.
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B) The New Social Condition of Minorities in the Process of Transition to Nation-
State
With the clear decline of Ottoman power and the rise of European influence in the 
nineteenth century, there was a catastrophic change for the worse in the position of the 
Ottoman non-Muslims. The material relationship between Muslim and Christian had changed 
beyond recognition. Even the theoretical basis of association was gone. The old, mutually 
accepted relationship between Muslims and Djimmis, giving a definite and agreed status and 
rights on the latter, had been undermined and destroyed by new ideas and ambitions. Liberal 
principles required the Turks to give the subject peoples full equality of rights in the state; 
national principles entitled these peoples to rebel against it, and establish independent states 
of their own; Christian and imperal principles enabled the powers of Europe to intervene on 
their side, supporting their claims both to citizenship and to secession. Under these 
circumstances, suspicion, fear, hatred transformed the Turkish attitude against the subject
people. Turkish weakness and uncertainty, towards foreign inavasion and internal rebellion, 
often led to dreadful oppression and brutality.
The disorder created in Macedonia and the Eastern Provinces by the failures of the 
Hamidian regime and the spread of nationalism caused a series of opposition movements, 
aimed at a restoration of the constitution. In 1896, the Society of Ottoman Union and Progress 
attempted a coup but failed. Than the Ottoman opposition activity that was effectively 
suppressed at home, shifted to Europe, where Young Turks (Jön Türkler) had already been 
busy with promoting ideas of reform. In 1902, the Young Turk émigrés organized a Congress 
of Ottoman Liberals in Paris but the conference split into two groups. One was calling for the 
promotion of an Ottoman national identity and increased centralization, and the other calling 
for decentralization. Finally in 1906, a group of civil servants and army officers, led by Talat,
founded a society in Salonica, known initially as the Ottoman Freedom Society and later as 
the CUP, committed to the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution and the reform of 
government44. In the spring of 190845, plans were made for a revolution and the restoration of 
the constitution and the capability of CUP, and scale of its organization come to a point that 
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it’s members could say to the Sultan 'Dynasty will be in danger' if he does not bring the 
constitution back. June 12, the Third Army in Macedonia began to march to Place. On 24 July 
the constitution was in order again. In summary, The 1908 Young Turk Revolution was a 
watershed event in the history of the late Ottoman Empire. The constitution of 1876 and the 
Ottoman Parliament, suspended by Abdulhamid II in 1878, were restored and Abdülhamid’s 
regime of over three decades was overturned. The following 31 March Event46 put an end to 
Abdulhamid's regime. CUP responded immediately by organising a Action Army (Hareket 
Ordusu) The success of revolution to replace the monarch institutions and policies with the 
constitutional institutions and electoral policies is controversial. Because, paradoxically, the 
suppression of the counter-revolution of 13 April 1909 did not lead to an immediate CUP 
seizure of power, but to a prolonged period of military rule.
The Ottoman defeat in Balkan Wars47 and the loss of extensive territories in Europe, 
inhabited by a majority Christian population, which those defeats entailed, caused a 
degression in the support given by Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals to the ideology of 
Ottomanism, previously seen as the essential ideological foundation of a multi-national state. 
Following the failure of the Ottoman government to unite the various peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire- evidenced by the outbreaks of rebellion in Macedonia, the Armenian provinces in 
Albania and the Yemen, a small group of Turks, including influential numbers of the 
Community of Union and Progress- CUP(İttihad and Terakki Cemiyeti), had come to believe 
that only by promoting Turkism, pan-Turkism and Turkish nationalism could the empire be 
saved48.  
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exception of Thrace and Albania, the latter of which became independent. Because the Treaty of London made no 
division of territory among the allies, and because Greece and Serbia had divided Macedonian territory between 
themselves in a bilateral agreement, Bulgaria attacked both, initiating the Second Balkan War. Greece and Serbia won 
victories that ensured major territorial gains at the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913
48 A.L. Macfie, (1998) “The End Of The Ottoman Empire”, Longman, Newyork, 1998
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Community of Union and Progress
CUP was the secret society which organised the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and 
later as a political party governed the empire until the end of the First World War. As empire-
savers, the Young Turks always viewed the problems confronting the Ottoman Empire from 
the standpoint of the state, placing little if any emphasis on the people's will. Thus the Young 
Turks inclination toward authoritarian theories was by no means a coincedence. All the 
theories that the Young Turks developed and took particular interest in, such as biological 
materialism, positivism, social Darwinism, and elitism, defended an enlighment from above 
and opposed the idea of a supposed equality among fellow-citizens.
A.L Mcfie argues that to some British commentators, CUP was constituted by merely 
a spurious combination of self-seeking “Jews, Socialists and Freemasons49”, representatives 
of the ‘Jew Committee of Union and Progress’, responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman 
army in the Balkan Wars. On the other hand, to many traditional Muslims, they appeared as 
infidels and atheists, the victim of an over-exposure to the decadent values of a degenerate 
Europe. For Mustafa Kemal, they were merely self-seeking opportunists, ‘blaqueurs’ who 
whilst engaging in corruption, war-profiteering and abuse on a massive scale, had by taking 
the Ottoman Empire into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, gambled 
irresponsively with its future.50 One of the most extreme denunciation of the CUP leadership 
belonged to a British diplomat and politician Sir Mark Sykes in ‘The Caliph’s Last Heritage’ 
(1913), referring to them as ‘dissipated, half-educated, emasculated babus’, ‘exponents of 
atheism, Jacobinism, materialism and license’ and ‘promoters of secret socities, lodges, 
assassinations, courts-martial, and strange, obscure policies’.
In regards to nationalism, the Young Turks underwent a gradual transformation. 
Beginning with the Tanzimat with non-Turkish members participating at the outset, the 
Young Turks were embraced Ottomanism51 as the official state ideology. Though, in Salonica 
on the eve of the restoration of constitution Enver had said: “Henceforth we are all brothers. 
There are no Bulgars, Greeks, Romainians, Jews, Muslims; under the blue sky we are all 
                                                            
49 Members were generally proposed by existing members, participated in ceremonies involving secret houses, 
blindfolds and oaths sworn on copies of the Koran, revolvers and knives. Traitors would be hunted down and killed. 
All Ottoman subjects were entitled to join, in irrespective of race.
50 E.Kedourie, “Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews’, Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.7, No.1, Jan. 1971, pp.89–104
51 Ottoman liberals leaded by Prince Sabahaddin, took the Ottoman Ideology as a tool for comprimising- not uniting-
with the non-Muslims. So he defended that the Millets as religious communities, should preserve their entities and 
priviledges as before. But the Committee of Union and Progress managed to defeat Sabaheddin's group in the elections 
held in 1908
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equal, we glory in being Ottomans. However Ottoman patriotism failed during First 
Constitutional Era, and coming years. Many non-Turkish Ottoman intellectuals rejected the 
idea because of its exclusive use of Turkish symbols. Turkish nationalists gradually gained 
the upper hand in politics, and following the Congress of 1902, a stronger focus on 
nationalism developed. It was at this time that Ahmet Riza chose to replace the term 
"Ottoman" with "Turk". However, it was not until 1904 that nationalism came to be based on 
a scientific theory and the Young Turks began to base their nationalism on the pseudo-
scientific race theories of Europe.
In the period that Committee of Union and Progress tended to Turkist policy and the 
subjects - except the Muslim Turks- broke off their ties with the state52, the non-Muslims 
were started to be regarded as minority rather than citizen. The size of the CUP's majority in 
parliament minorities became outsiders. The deported Muslims (Turks) from the Balkans 
were located in the western parts of Anatolia and they brought their own issues. Armenians 
were expecting more representation through the parliament, but the nature of democracy kept 
them in a minority position. That was an unexpected result for the Armenians after they had 
been in a very protected position since 1453. By 1910, non-Muslims did not take place in the 
definition of the Ottoman Nation anymore. 
For CUP, now on Ottomanism would motivate the nationalism and economic 
development of non-Muslims in disadvantage of Turkish nation. It would also accelerate the 
collapse of the Ottoman Unity. Thus a strong central organisation was needed for the 
economy and education. In order to provide this centrilisation and homogenisation, they 
pursued the classical method. The principle of ‘citizenship’ was created on the values of the 
dominant national group and combined with a cultural identity. Assimilation was taken as a 
main policy, so starting from 1908, the political associations and unities, that had a national 
name, were forbidden. Than all the foundations and clubs of minorities were started to be 
closed53. Within the new “Great Turkish Family” of the Turkists, it was clear that there were 
no place for the non-Muslims. In this way, there was no remain of an ideological cement for 
togetherness of non-Muslims and Turkish Muslims.
                                                            
52 In Macedonia and the Eastern Provinces, many commitadjis, chetniks and other guerrilla fighters, who were 
dissappointed at the pace of Ottoman Reform, returned to the hiils. Only among the Jews, particularly those located in 
Salonica and Izmir, whose very survival was threatened by the rising tide of Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism, 
did support for the ideology of Ottomanism
53 Taner Akçam (1993) “Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu, İletişim Yayınları, 1993
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The Armenian Deportation
One of the most tragic case in history occurred in the period revolving around WWI; 
the Armenian Deportation. The political and cultural impact of Russians, new national and 
liberal ideas coming from Europe, strongly affected the Ottoman Armenians, especially the 
rising middle class and the active Armenian nationalist movement. For Turks, the Armenian 
movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, 
Albanians and Greeks, they could reluctantly withdraw which meant to abandon the distant 
provinces. But the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier 
to the Mediaterranean coast, was in the heart of the state. To abandon these lands would mean 
the dissolution of the state54. Turkish and Armenian villages had for centuries lived in 
neighbourly association but now a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single 
homeland was the case. 
The humiliation of Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamıs, together with the expectation of 
further Russian advances and fears regarding Armenian treachery, led in 1915 Deportation 
and massacre of Armenians. According to Macfie55, more than half a million, and for Lewis56
a million and half Armenians died as well as an unknown number of Turks. Numbers and the 
intension of government remains obscure and controversial. But even Cemal and Talat Pashas 
accepted that the application resulted with a cruel violance and massacre although for them, 
the deportation was a compulsory action. 
In the early months of the First World War Dasnaksutiun and Henchak groups (based 
in Tiflis) organised Armenian volunteer units, with the expectation of Russian support for 
their conquest of the Eastern Provinces and liberate the Armenian inhabitants of the area. At 
the same time Armenians living in Zeytun, who had refused to be conscripted in to the 
Ottoman Army, organised a corps of volunteers designed to disrupt Ottoman lines of 
communication, while Armenians living abroad invoked Entente Powers to give arm and 
equipment for the force of 20,000 men to raise. The aim was to provide an uprising in Cilicia 
(Kilis) and securing control of Alexandretta (İskenderun) which was a strategic port on Syrian 
coast. In Van and in Zeytun, Armenians widespreadly uprised then the Porte passed a series of 
deportation laws authorising the removal of the Armenian population from startegic areas and 
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their resettlement in the Euphrates Valley and other areas to the south province of Diyarbakir. 
In the ensuing implementation of the deportation laws, carried out by Ottoman gendarmerie 
units, convicts released from prison for the purpose, Kurdish tribesmen, and according to 
some arguments, units belonging to the special organization, robbery, rape and murder 
occurred on an extensive scale. Starvation, famine were also at place. Ottoman government 
took few steps to protect the deportees, but the precise extent of Ottoman guilt remains in 
doubt. 
Armenian historians and propagandists are convinced that the deportations, far from 
being an accidental consequence of the circumstances, were the result of a deep-laid plan, 
designed by the CUP leadership in Istanbul. They ‘wanted to exploit the opportunity offered 
by the war to solve once and for all the problem of the Armenian minority- a potent source of 
conflict and Great Power intervention’. There have been an argument which showes Mustafa 
Kemal as an acceptor of the Armenian massacre led by CUP. According to this argument, he 
gave an interview to a Swiss journalist and artist Emile Hilderbrand in July 1926 and he 
explained his views against a group of Young Turks after they planned to assasinate Mustafa 
Kemal during his visit to Izmir which was cancelled when a woman denounced the 
assasination plan. In the interview that is published in ‘Los Angeles Examiner’, Kemal seems 
to blame the Young Turks for the massacre of “millions of our Christian subjects.” Armenian 
diaspora shows this interview as the supporter of the genocide fact. According to the article, 
in the ninth paragraph, Kemal Ataturk admits the Armenian Genocide by saying: “ I am about 
to show these plotters that the Republic of Turkey cannot be overthrown by murderers or 
through their murderous designs... These left_overs from the former Young Turk Party, who 
should have been made to account for the lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were 
ruthlessly driven en masse, from their homes and massacred, have been restive under the 
republican rule.”  Murat Bardakçı and Türkkaya Ataöv defend that a person called Emile 
Hilderbrand had not exist, there was no record of her visit to Turkey neither as a journalist 
except her published interview with Mustafa Kemal.
In 15-17 March 2006 a conference called “New Dimensions in the Turkish-Armenian 
Relations” took place in İstanbul Universty (İÜ). Chief of the Atatürk Research Center Prof. 
Dr. Mehmet Saray, the participant of the conference, mentioned about an American journalist 
Clarence K. Streit (26 February 1921) who asked Mustafa Kemal “Are the arguments true?” 
Saray said that Mustafa Kemal answered his question in this way: “None of the arguments are 
true. No nation is respective as much as Turks to the language, culture and religion of other 
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nations. Rums and Armenians lived and will live their life comfortably as long as they dont 
collaborate with our enemies"
Turkish historians and propagandists argue that deportations of 1915, in the midst of 
the Galipoli campaign that threatened the survival of the empire, were the inevitable 
consequence of Armenian treachery and rebellion. As for the unfortunate consequences of the 
policy of deportation which was unintended and were only the outcome of sickness and 
exhaustion suffered by the deportees on their long marches, of the attacks launched by gangs 
of Kurds and other irresponsible elements, beyond government control. 
For today, Turkey’s official attitude of not accepting the Armenian thesis of 
‘genocide’, found it’s reflection on the relations between two neighboor states, Armenia and 
Turkey. For the Armenian diaspora especially in Europe and US, this situation had became a 
‘matter of existence’ which they re-produce and feed their ethnic and political identity. In 
general, all the Armenian children raised with the historical conscious related to the 1915, 
whereas Turks are rarely aware of the event as a result of the education policy. But fanatics 
from both sides, have been effective in this matter for so long, only for last few years, a 
platform for dialoque and alternative approaches from both sides could become possible.
Unfortunately, for both parts this sensitive issue have been carried beyond legal, 
social, historical and phildsophical manners and surrounded by real- politik. Even USA 
Congress will approve the draft for accepting the Armenian Genocide, as the majority of the 
congress consist of the Democrats. More than fifteen countries (Argentina, Germany, 
Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, Lebanon, Russia, Slovakia, Uruguay, Greece 
and Poland) did the same thing and in France and Belgium denying the genoside is a crime.
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II) Practices Against the Non-Muslim Minorities in Context of Foreign 
Policy in Single-Party Period
The Young Turk period can be viewed as the process of ‘conversion’ to Turkism and 
it prepared the ground for Kemalism. Main factors that drove them in the direction of Turkism 
were; the territorial losses which showed that the collapse of the empire was immenent, the 
spread of nationalism among the Arabs and the fear that Turks might completely lose their 
dominant position in empire. The period of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, following the final 
dissolution of the empire, enabled Turkism to became a political doctrine57. According to 
Kushner, Kemalists did not produce an ideology in the strict sense, but their statements and 
actions did point to some definite directions. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Turkey, like 
Germany, pursued nationalism through a defensive modernization. Such nationalism from 
above constituted the founding ideology of the new Turkish Republic.
The basis of the new republic was to be found in loyalty both to the homeland 
Anatolia and to the Turkish Nation that inhabited it. First, all citizens of the Turkish state 
were deemed constitutionally as Turks in a period of instilling a sense of patriotism in all 
members of the population. However, it was understood and often implied that there also 
existed a Turkish nation in the ethnic sense with a history, language and culture all its own.
The Sevres Treaty
One of the critical turning points in the process of social political and intellectual 
transition of Turkey occurred at the time of the First World War58. It was symbolized by the 
final collapse of the multi-national Ottoman Empire and the rise of the territorially limited, 
nationalist Republic of Turkey. The victorious Allies were finally completing their 
arrangements for the disposal of the “Sick Man’s” worldly goods. After a series of 
conferences in London and San Remo, a treaty was drawn up and was signed by the Allies 
and by the representatives of Sultan at Sevres on 10 August 1920. It was far more harsher 
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than that imposed on a defeated Germany59. However, it was never implemented. While the 
Allies were imposing their terms on the submissive government of the Sultan, a new Turkish 
movement was emerging in Anatolia, led by men who rejected the treaty and its principles 
and condemned those Turks who accept it as traitors and gave them sentence. From the 
moment of his landing at Samsun, Mustafa Kemal had been at work in Anatolia, organizing 
the cadres of a national army and preparing the ground for a war of liberation. That 
movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, used the treaty as the occasion to declare 
itself the rightful government of Turkey, replacing the monarchy based in Istanbul with a 
republic based in Ankara. 
The Empire would have lost a great deal of territory by the terms of this treaty. Hejaz 
(now part of Saudi Arabia) and Armenia were to become independent. Kurdistan was to be 
given independency, according to third Section, Articles 62-64; the Kurdish Province of 
Mosul would also be able to join the independent Kurdistan. In accordance with the wartime 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, Mesopotamia and Palestine were assigned under mandate to the 
tutelage of the United Kingdom, Lebanon and an enlarged Syria to that of France. The 
Dodecanese and Rhodes (already under Italian occupation since 1911), with portions of 
southern Anatolia, were to pass to Italy.  Based on the British support of Greek ambitions, 
Sevres, promised the fulfilment of Megali Idea as Thrace and Western Anatolia, including the 
key port of Smyrna, would become part of Greece. The Bosphorus, Dardanelles and Sea of 
Marmara were to be demilitarized and internationalized, and the Ottoman army was to be 
restricted to strength of 50,000 men. 
M.Kemal's separate treaty with the USSR and his later victories against the Greeks 
enabled the nationalist government of Kemal to repel and defeat the Greek forces by 
September 1922. These events forced the former wartime Allies to return to the negotiating 
table, and the terms of Sevres were cancelled in Turkey's favor by the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923. Now, the new leader of the new republic was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,  the ‘hero’ of the 
Turkish Independence War (1919–22).
This treaty took a strong place in public memory and a tendency for regarding all the 
external (Western) demands, suggestions within the context of this ‘the Serves paranoia’: The 
strong thought of ‘Western powers had always wanted to divide The Republic of Turkey by 
using the minorities and this will not be changed’. Most of the conspiracy theories of Turkish 
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nationalists and even of the official discourse come out from the content of Sevres. On 
contrary, Lausanne meant an international recognition of the demands formulated in the 
Turkish National Pact. Therefore, Lausanne is perceived as the founder treaty, whereas Sevres 
was the destructive one. But for the Armenian, Greek and Kurdish communities, Sevres 
remained as ‘a missed historical opportunity’and Lausanne was ‘a historical unfair’.
Taner Akçam mentions another historical context of Sevres, he defends that the 
tendency of regarding the conflicts symbolized in Sevres and Lausanne merely as ‘a war of 
land and boundaries’ should be exceeded. Because the human rights (in today’s concept) 
dimension was also determinant in the process of 1918-1923. The Allied Forces wanted to 
punish Turks for what they did to Christian minorities, particularly to Armenians during the 
WWI. Furthermore, the nations such as Arabs, Greeks and Armenians ‘should be saved from’ 
the Turkish dominancy. The punishment of Turks should be taken in two ways. First, the 
government members and officials those were responsible for the crimes against other 
nations, would be judged personally and second, Turks to be contented with a small and weak 
state. Hence, the visible reason for dividing Anatolia between different nations was the desire 
of punishing Turks for their cruelty. 
In Paris Convention this became apparent Turkish Independence Movement supported 
the punishment of the responsible but they were against the way of practicing it as Allies 
wanted to break Anatolia. Akçam argues that if allied powers could make a difference 
between the National Pact and punishment of the massacres, today we would be telling a very 
different history. But the treaties for dividing Anatolia and the imperialist interests prevent 
this, thus they did not prefer punishing the crimes against humanity in accordance with 
recognizing the Ottoman’s right of sovereignty. Their attitude made M. Kemal and his fellows 
reluctant to punish the Criminals of Armenian Massacre.
RPP and Minorities
Single-Party Period (1923–46), was the constitution process of Kemalist Ideology and 
carrying its practices in to life. Turkish nationalism was transformed from being an elite 
discourse to a state ideology. According to the 1923 Party Regulation of RPP, ‘identification 
with Turkish culture was an inevitable requirement for the party membership’. Thus at that 
period, the cultural importance of Turkism came before citizenship. In 1927’s Regulation,  
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expression of “National solidarity is based on the unity of language, ideal and thought” is 
added. In 1935’s party programme, the fatherland was described as ‘the sacred country within 
our present political boundaries, where the Turkish nation lives with its ancient and illustrious 
history, and with its past glories still living in the depths of its soil’.
The 37th and 42nd Clauses of the Lausanne Treaty placed under international guarantee 
a social equilibrium for the minorities, which resembled their life under the Ottoman regime.  
The leaders who were negotiating agreements to consolidate their new nation-states as entities 
independent of outside interference did not welcome the necessary imposition of guarantees 
for existing minorities. Nevertheless, within this arrangement, minorities hoped for the 
continuation of preserving their own cultural identity, social order, and language in a fashion 
similar to their century fold existence in the area.  But the new republic was resolved to melt 
all ethnic elements under the principle of a ‘single language -single ideal- single culture’ thus 
creating a national identity for the nation-state. These policies conflicted with the foresaid 
clauses (especially the 42.) guaranteeing minority rights. First the Jews, then the Armenians 
along with Rums had to abstigate from their rights confirmed by this clause. In appearance, 
this was a willful act of good faith on the part of the minorities, but a quick glance at the 
official statements and media coverage gives clues to pressures applied.
There was a general consensus on demands for the minorities to speak in Turkish, adopt 
Turkish names, adapt to the Turkish culture and prioritize the Turkish ideal at the expense of 
their religious/ethnic identities. Among the Turkish Jews, the reverent ideologue of 
Turkification Moiz Kohen or Tekin Alp, with divine inspiration from the Ten 
Commandments, proclaimed his own Evamir-i Aşere with respect to the assimilation of 
Turkey’s Jews. In his ten commends, he called them in this way: 1) Turkify your names, 2) 
Speak Turkish, 3) Pray in Turkish in Synagogues, 4) Turkify your schools, 5) Send your 
children to Turkish Schools, 6) Get engaged with national issues, 7) Stick together with 
Turks, 8) Affiliate yourself with community spirit, 9) Fulfill your duties in the national 
economy, 10) Be aware of your rights.
According to Bali60, the main reason of that 1924 Constitution could not be practiced 
equally without discriminating as Muslim and non-Muslim was not that the minorities could 
not be Turkified at the desired speed. But the reason was the absolutely negative impression 
of the minority’s attitude during the final stages of the Ottoman Empire and during the 
Anatolian occupation, imprinted on the memories of the people as well as the administration. 
For Bali, the nationalist and secessionist tendencies of the Armenian community also had a 
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defining influence on the Armenian Deportation. Turkish-Muslim collective memory did not 
erase the symbolism of events like Rums applauding the Greek invasion of Smyrna. 
When the 1930’s came, growing disappointment from nationalists and founding elites 
was to be reflected as cultural isolationism, minority-opposition and foreign enmity as the 
cosmopolitan mentality of the past would be mostly displaced and forgotten. As clear from 
the slogan of that era: “Turkey belongs to Turks”, parallel to nationalistic policies, the 
uncompromised prevalence of Turkish ethnic identity has marked every realm of social and 
political life. Among these policies one can recount pressuring foreign firms to carry out all 
their correspondence in Turkish, making it mandatory to have 75% of workers in foreign 
firms Muslim-Turkish, and specifically appointing Muslim Turks as civil servants as well as 
in other key positions. Informal pressures were also abundant, inciting shop owners, small 
business owners, doctors, lawyers and others to fire non-Muslim personnel and appoint 
Muslim Turks. As an example of practices which were raised to legal status, one can recount 
the decree no. 2007, ‘Law concerning Arts and Services assigned to the Turkish Citizens of 
Turkey’, put into practice in 1934. As a result of this law, nine thousands Istanbul Rums have 
reportedly been left unemployed and forced to leave their country. These policies have greatly 
contributed to the diminishing of the non-Muslim population in Istanbul. 
In 1926, the British Ambassador Sir R. Lindsay explained the psychological factors 
behind the Turkification process as; The Republic was resolved to surround itself with a 
Chinese wall of exclusiveness and reconstruct a State which would have no room for foreign 
influence even by individuals and traders61. The distrust against non-Muslim minorities was 
resourced by the policy of Great Powers toward Turkey for more than a hundred years. 
Lindsay argued that this policy had received the support of the whole population.
According to Bali, the greatest damage of the Capital Tax Levy was the destruction of 
trust at a time when the Turkification policies of minorities (begun in 1923) had slowly paved 
the way for an easier settlement among the minorities and the Single Party regime was 
beginning to gradually earn their confidence. Not to mention the fact that the incident became 
a constant reminder that non-Muslims are and can be treated as “second-rate citizens” as far 
as the public and the political powers were concerned. 
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The Social Design of the Republic: Creating Citizens
For Bali62, at first there were two goals: First, to build a nation-state out of a congregate 
of people who have defined themselves as Muslims and non-Muslims for centuries, and make 
citizens out of subjects. As the Turkish Republic was established as a nation-state, the ruling 
elites did not let the community system to remain as it was before. Thus the religious 
associations had not given legal personality, such as Rum-Orthodox Patriarchate. Second, to 
crown the National War with an economic war of independence. For Economical 
Turkification63, it was thought that the birth of a national bourgeoisie was imminent. For this 
Project, one of the components of which was the Capital Tax Levy, it was targeted that the 
status of minorities and foreign nationals - who were at the top of the commercial or industrial 
life of Turkey as merchants, civil servants or managers, would be stripped down to oblivion. 
Bali believes that despite major social upheavals, Turkish minorities of the time either 
believed or wanted to believe that their life style would not change drastically from that of the 
Ottoman era and would last under the new regime. The minorities had a newly found 
confidence in their acceptance as ‘citizens’ while before they were ‘djimmi’, and they planned 
to contribute their best into the construction of new Turkey, as they were full of hope. But 
there were elements unaccounted for; The wild reforms in succession, demands that 
minorities immediately leave their community life which they had practiced ‘intervention-
free’ for centuries and become Turks, the collective memory of the minorities siding with the 
Alliance during the national struggle, etc. 
Cultural Assimilation 
The leaders of the Republic had implemented the reforms with thunderous speed and 
had demanded from the people absolute compliance with them without the benefit of a 
provisional period of adaptation. The reason was partly about that the founders were 
frustrated with the minorities who could not accept Turkification at the desired pace and who 
even showed certain resistance. Sanctions first came to mind, but they were not implemented.  
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Tekin Alp stated that taking forceful measures for the Turkification of minorities would mean 
a breach of law that would result in the West reacting that despotism in Turkey is relived. 
Instead, ‘indirect’ approaches were applied towards the assimilation of minorities. 
In an environment where pure Turkish was striven for, speaking Turkish became 
mandatory with legal penalties at play. The Turkification of names was attempted in 
accordance with the Third Article of the Law of Surnames passed in the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey in 21 June 1937, and the use of tribal or foreign names was banned. The 
justification was that “These kinds of last names would offend the ideal of national unity.” 
There was fervor of teaching Turkish everywhere including Public Houses (halkevi), and the 
Jews did not speak Turkish during this process, while Turks frequently intervened to that end. 
Tensions rose, legal cases were run, and fights broke out64. Minorities were forced to 
education in Turkish and it was decided that minority communities pay for the attendants who 
would teach them Turkish at their own schools. For certain, the policies of Turkification 
responsible for minorities abandonment of Istanbul during the early years of the republic, in 
spite of the clauses underlying the minority rights in the Lausanne Treaty.
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A) The Lausanne Treaty and the Population Exchange of Rums &Turks
The exchange of populations of 1923, together with the Armenian deaths and 
deportations during the First World War were resulted in the formation of an ethnically 
‘cleansed’ Turkish entity. Finally, the Turkish Republic was founded on the basis of a 
relatively homogeneous population65. Thus, as Keyder puts, the aim of the Lausanne 
exchange can be seen as the civilised version of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as it was negotiated and 
accepted. The compulsory exchange of populations of 1923 between Greece and Turkey was 
a component part of the Lausanne Peace Conference, which took place at the end of the 
Turkish Independence War. The war was concluded when the armies of the Greek occupation 
of Anatolia supported by the Allies at the end of the First World War were defeated in August 
1922 by the Turks. 
Baskın Oran66 emphazises that the 45th Article which is a famous clause of Lausanne 
did not state a ‘reciprocity’ principle for Turkey and Greece but instead it was an article of 
‘parallel obligation’. Otherwise, it would mean that if one day Greece gives up the application 
of the minority rights of Western Thrace Turks, than Turkey can cancel same rights for her 
non-Muslim minority. Anyway, if we had called it as ‘reciprocity’, than this interpretation 
would be against the 60/5 Article of the Contract of Viyana Law of Treaties (1963-Viyana 
Antlaşmalar Hukuku Sözleşmesi).This article definitely forbids any negative approach of 
‘reciprocity’ within human rights subject. Moreover,  the concept of reciprocity is a concept 
of international policy. As far as citizens are concerned, it cannot been applied such concepts 
to justify taking back certain right unless one sees it’s own citizens as foreigners or as 
indigenous foreigners, than the principal of reciprocity might be a good excuse.
According to the Article I, the Lausanne Treaty defined those who must leave as: from 
Turkey, Turkish nationals of Greek Othodox religion; and from Greece, Greek nationals of 
Muslim religion. In conclusion 355,635 Muslim-Turks were expelled from Greece to Turkey 
and 189,916 Rum Ortodox were expelled from Turkey to Greece. However, Greece67 in 
reality, had to receive a total of 1.2 million expellees because she had already received one-
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million refugees who had left Turkey during the defeat of the Greek armies in August 1922 
referred by Greeks as ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’(Mikrasiatiki Katastrophi). Article II of the 
Convention defined the exception68 as in Turkey, Greeks settled in Istanbul prefecture prior to 
30 October 1918, and in Greece, the Muslims inhabitants of Western Thrace. As a 
consequence of Article 2,130,000 Muslim- Turks stayed in Western Thrace and about the 
same number of Rums in Istanbul.
Article 2b of the Convention used the term ‘Muslims’, not ‘Turks’, for the minority in 
Western Thrace as at the time of the exchange, religion and confession counted more than 
ethnicity and as the Allies and Greece wanted all the Muslims69 to be the subject in the 
exchange. The exchange and its compulsory nature were proposed by the Allies, in particular 
Great Britain. Lord Curson regarded that the exchange should be compulsory because it 
would otherwise take months to implement the Convention; that the exchanged Turks should 
be able to start tilling Thrace as soon as possible which would help Greece to make place for 
the influx of refugees and compensate the exchanged people for the property they would be 
leaving behind. However, the real reason was that the Allies’s radical solution to the question 
of minorities would ease their duty of guaranteeing the stability of the new international order, 
since the issue of minorities in Europe was one of the causes of the First World War.
Venizelos, the prime minister of Greece, gave great importance to the exclusion from 
the exchange of the Rum population of Istanbul. Thus, about 110.000 Rums in Istanbul were 
designated as non-exchangeable. The size of number which would force Greece to demand 
US to increase her emigration quota was a factor but the real reason was that it would be 
against his popular theory of ‘Megali Idea70’ (Great Idea).  He had been also fuelling the 
Greek public opinioun with the idea of ‘Ionia’(Western Turkey) to become part of Greece. So 
it would be difficult to have the public accept the exchange of Istanbul Rums, because 
Istanbul being ‘the Second Rome’ and the seat of the Holy Fener Rum Ortodox Patriarchate, 
it would mean the end of the Megali Idea. In return, the exclusion from the exchange of a 
substantial number of Muslim-Turks just within the Greek border, was ensured.
Ismet Pasha, head of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne also defended a compulsory 
exchange and all the Rums of Turkey be included in it. For him, Christian minorities had 
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always been the pretext for the Great Powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire.The collaboration of Rums and the Patriarchate with Greek armies during 
the occupation was too fresh in the Kemalist’s minds. Like many states of the Balkans at the 
time, Turkey was also ready to attempt a full-scale nation-building process but the minorities 
were considered a strong barrier for this aim. Ismet Pasha wanted Western Thrace to be 
excluded from the exchange for a possible plebiscite in the region in future where the Turks 
were in a majority.
Bernard Lewis suggested that the population exchange was really “No repatriation at 
all, but two deportations into exile- of Christian Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to 
Turkey.”71 This was not an issue of everyone returning to their own land; it was about the 
deportation of people of both sides. Ayhan Aktar states that the fact that minority exchange 
was accepted as a viable and lawful alternative induced in the nationalistic elites a 
comfortable passivity and stupor72. These elites were led to believe that minorities could to a 
large extent be deposed of in this way, and they refrained from laboring over legal and 
political adjustments enabling the peaceful coexistence of various social groups within the 
country. The minorities were “exchangeable stuff at times of crises.” The word ‘guest’ used in 
place of non-Muslim minorities explicates clearly their status at the time. In conjunction with 
this view, discriminative policies making the minority subject’s lives intolerable thus 
pressuring them towards emigration has always been a more favored approach. From the 
beginning, the possibility of forming a civic identity around which the population, as an 
aggregate of individuals, might find cohesion was rejected. This precluded the possibility of a 
citizenship based on the principles that would apply regardless of differences in religion, 
language or race. On contrary, the emphasis was made on ethnic unity and collective purpose 
echoing within the state’s authoritarian nationalism.
With the advent of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the mutual purging of Greek and 
Turkish minorities, both countries have underwent a process of ‘purification and 
homogenization’. Aktar states how the exchange of minorities has resulted in such cleansing 
“Accept for Western Thrace in Greece, and Istanbul in Turkey, it is not possible to speak of 
non-Muslim minorities in either country.”  But this view partially contradicts with the 
9thBureau report detailing the plan of moving minorities out of Anatolia into Istanbul. The 
Orthodox Karaman Rums, whose native language is Turkish, were also included in this 
relocation since exchange was founded on religion rather than language. 
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Consequences of the Exchange
The homogenization process of the population during the founding of the nation –state 
is catalyzed by the wars between 1912-1922 – Balkan wars, WWI, National Independence 
War-. Especially during WWI, the forced emigration of Armenians populating Anatolia has 
been a turning point with regards to purifying Anatolia of its non-Muslim population. While 
in 1906 the population in the area within the boundaries of Turkey was around 15 million, in 
1927 this number was no more than 13.6 million. In the words of Keyder, “Before WWI, one 
out of five persons in the geographical area that is now Turkey was a Christian; by the end of 
1923, the proportion had declined to one in forty.  
Anatolian Rums represented not only a huge addition to the existing population but also 
a more educated and wealthier group than the indigenous Greeks. The bourgeoisie and 
professional middle class of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in 19th Century, were largely 
consisted of non-Muslims. They also took crucial role in modernizing efforts of the state. 
Thus, an inevitable outcome of the population movement and later exchange was the removal 
from Turkey of its economically and socially most ‘modernized’ citizens. Turkey lost its 
entrepreneurial class. The exodus of traders and businessmen from trading towns and ports, 
excepting only Istanbul, radically disrupted the economic life of the region. However, the 
Muslims who came from Greece were mostly settled in the countryside, and generally did not 
have much effect on the political and social development of the country. So the impact of the 
exchange in the two societies was asymmetrical, not only because of the numbers involved 
but also because the type of refugee differed greatly. Following the Ankara Convention 
(1930), Raymond Hare stated in his report that: “Greece has gained economically and lost 
politically, and Turkey has gained politically but lost economically.”73 The political loss of 
Greece was due to the outside interference as the settlement of Anatolian refugees was 
financed by foreign loans, aids. Turkey’s political gain was, on contrary, getting rid of her 
domestic affairs of interference from the Great Powers. By emptying of Anatolia of its non-
Muslim minorities, the basis for such interference was abolished.
As the non-Muslim population was eliminated, their properties and positions became 
part of the dowry of the new state that could now distribute them to the population. This 
distribution helped both to ease the creation of a native bourgeoisie and to ensure its 
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indebtedness to the state. Perhaps as a result of economic envy, the people who believed 
themselves as the ‘real sons of Turkish lands’ and their political representatives have virtually 
competed with each other to obtain the lion’s share in the redistribution of wealth left over 
from migrated Anatolian Rums. Since the exodus was carried out in a hurry, even personal 
property was left behind. In Smyrna, from villages and towns, the population fled with little 
more than their lives74. Looting in abandoned houses was commonplace. This was made 
easier by the fact that the Rumelian Muslims entered Turkey almost a year after the Rums left. 
Moreover, these people had to leave practically with what they could carry. More importantly, 
the immovable property left behind by expellees became a problematic issue between Turkey 
and Greece and could not been solved for eight years. In 1930, the Ankara Convention settled 
problems concerning the property rights of the expellees.
In typical fashion, locals who have stroke especially good relations with the Ankara 
government had confiscated Rum property named ‘Emval-i Metruke’. Moreover, these locals 
and elites with Ankara connections have been able to get the largest shares of small industry 
enterprises and businesses left by the urban Rums. They were lacked commercial expertise 
but they had the advantage of government support, which would limit their development as an 
independent bourgeoisie. A deputy from Balıkesir took a house in the town center, a summer 
residence, thousands of olive trees and a soup factory around Ayvalik. A point that needs to 
be emphasized here is that looting was not just carried out by a specific portion of the society 
but by the attendance of the masses75 in general. The housing problem in Turkey was already 
serious before the issue of exchange emerged since the Western part of Turkey had been the 
stage of war during 1919-22, and was further damaged by the devastation of the Greek Army. 
There were thousands of homeless local Turks, who were trying to survive in properties that 
had been burned down during the military operations.
In a secret meeting of GNP, Dr. Rıza Nur made a speech concerning minorities and 
population exchange. His views were significant in many aspects since he personally carried 
out sub-commission debates during the Lausseane Treaty regarding minority issues. He 
pointed out that the minority problem has been affectively dealt with through the Exchange 
Treaty and the Rums could not return to Turkey. When delegates asked about Armenians and 
Jews, Dr. Nur replies: “But friends, how many Jews are there, anyway. And there are thirty 
thousand Jews in Istanbul. So far they have been a problem-free, lenient group, but naturally 
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I would prefer they weren’t here.” The natural consensus in GNP was that getting rid of the 
minorities in Anatolia was a question of survival, and as long as they remained in Turkey, 
they would have been used by European powers as an excuse for meddling into Domestic 
affairs. The Deputy of Karesi Vehbi Bey, in his assembly speech in 5 November 1924 
addressed this sentiment: “ The arrival of every individual is a source of wealth for us; and 
the departure of every individual who leaves is a blessing!” But the individuals coming from 
Greece were culturally very different from them, and instead of contributing to a 
homogeneous population, they were in that regard, the sources of disappointment. 
Above all, the loss of shared experience is accompanied by growing ignorance of the 
ways of others; so, separation caused the loss of ground for communication. The sense of 
familiarity that carries the potential for understanding and respect was gone. Instead of it, 
suspicion, hostility, prejudice and inability in cooperation took its place, as we have 
frequently witnessed in Turkish-Greek relations. And the fate of those who were allowed to 
stay became hostages to the events in Greco-Turkish state relations. Rums that were migrated 
perceived in Greece as ‘Turkish seeds’ and ‘ones baptized in yogurt’. Here, indigenous Turks 
considered Muslims who left Greece as ‘half-infidel’. The concentration of Greek or 
Albanian- speaking refugees in certain regions disturbed the nationalists, who desired full 
homogeneity of the population. Aktar states that instead of an imagined community similar to 
their own, they faced ‘a group of people from a rural background, speaking foreign languages 
with very different life-styles’. Their attitude constituted the backbone of the 1930s cultural 
xenophobia, which eroded the cosmopolitanism of the late Ottoman period. But actually a 
human tragedy was happening as these people had to leave everything behind; their past and 
future was sacrificed for a negotiation between two states that were feticide in ethnic 
homogenization. Nevertheless, no one can be sure about that those who were allowed to stay 
were luckier then the ones who left. 
      
Initial Violations of Minority Rights
In the section of ‘Protection of Minorities’ including Articles 37-4476, those who were 
allowed to stay were defined as minority. Thus Rums were given minority rights that were 
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based on the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919 together with the Armenians and Jews. 
Article45 putted a principle that would in turn govern Greece’s attitude towards its Muslim 
minority. However, most of these rights remained on paper. Particularly in 1955s, when the 
Cyprus question came as a conflicted issue in the relations of Greece and Turkey, lives of the 
two etablis communities became harder. The Rum population of Istanbul decreased from 
110,000 (1923) to 2500 today. The population of Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace 
also degreased despite its high rate of population growth, as minimum 300,000 people have 
left Greece since 1923.
It did not take long before reciprocal violations emerged. First, both Turkey and 
Greece tried to move the etablis from certain strategic zones. Greece cleared them from her 
Turkish border (Evros) as soon as possible and Turkey did the same in the islands of 
Gökçeada and Bozcaada within few years. In Evros, incoming Rums settled so the population 
of the Muslim-Turks, who were majority before 1923 and held 84 percent of the land, became 
a numerical minority. The Rum refugees from Eastern Thrace were able freely to take the 
property and livestock of the Western Trace etablis as the security forces did not stop them. 
At the end, Muslim-Turks had to left everything and take refuge in Turkey77. A year later, in 
1924, the number of Greeks increased from 34,000 to 189,000.
Another violation occurred in the issue of the election of the Mufti and the Head-Mufti 
by the Muslim Turkish community. According to the law 2345/1920 which was promulgated 
to meet the requirement of the 1913 Athens Treaty78, the Muslim-Turkish community could 
elect its own religious leaders. As Alexandris points, religion was one of the most significant 
unifying factors among the Muslim ethnic groups in Thrace. Therefore the functioning of the 
mufti system is very important for the minority. Two muftis and an assistant mufti offer 
spiritual guidance to the Muslims but also have judicial functionaries. Between 1923 and 
1990, muftis were chosen by the Muslim leadership, then the Greek government endorsed and 
appointed the new muftis. Minority activists especially after 1980, demanded that the muftis 
to be elected by the popular vote. But Greece were worrying about the risk of prevalence of 
political Islam within Greek borders.
On the other hand, in Turkey the special self-administration priviledges given to the 
inhabitants of Gökçeada and Bozcaada under 14th Article of the Peace Treaty were never 
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implemented. Furthermore, the right to education in mother tongue was denied in 1927. Both 
states were reluctant from the beginning to implement the minority rights as they have 
regarded them as an external interference that interrupt their homogenization- assimilation 
programme.
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B) 1934 Events of Thrace 
In the summer of 1934 Eastern Thrace was shaken by a wave of antisemitic violence 
including commercial boycott, beating, rape, plunder and threating. The reasons and 
responsibles underlying this attack on the Jewish minority are still controversial. But the most 
critical point is that the events should be conserned in context of Turkish–Italian tensions in 
the spring of 1934 rather than the sudden effects of Nazism in Turkey. On the other hand, 
foreign anti-Semitic influence in bringing about the 1934 events of Thrace has frequently 
been emphasized, especially in the studies of Haluk Karabatak79 and Avner Levi80. 
The Fascist wave in between the two great wars have no doubt influenced Turkish 
politics and resulted in certain political movements, which have fostered anti-Semitism in 
Turkey. As Karabatak stresses together with the Turkish History Thesis and Sun- Language 
Theory, 1930s were the years that subjected to the project of creating the ‘Great and Glorious 
Turkish Nation’. Moreover, General Secretary of RPP Recep Peker met with the Second 
President of the German Nazi Youth and bilaterally they expressed their adornments to each 
other.  The invitation to Germany by the magazine Der Stürmer extended to the anti-Semitist 
Cevat Rıfat Atilhan and his warm reception by Nazi elites has been stated as an example of 
Nazi manipulation of Turkey. But as Levi indicates, the 2510 Law of Settlement had already 
been in preparation for over two years – well before Hitler took up the Jewish issue. In 
essence, the law was about Eastern revolts and Kurdish events but the fact that its 
implementation was in 1934, the same year as the publication of ‘National Transformation’ 
(Milli Inkilap- Atilhan’s anti-Semitic magazine) had been an unlucky coincidence. Aktar 
rightly questions the circulation of the magazine and concerns doubts about it’s catalyzing 
effect on later events. 
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Government’s Role
The position of the government is actually more important than whether the events in 
Thrace were foreign based / provoked or not. In the circular sent on 15 July 1934 by RPP 
General Secretary Recep Peker to the administration, he demanded an explanation as to why 
the events were not reported to the General Secretariat at any phase. This has been cited as 
evidence decreasing the responsibility of RPP headquarters. The blame has largely gone to 
local RPP administrations; the problem has been approached as a local, isolated event. 
Contradictingly, the Jewish community has sent a petition to the Head Ministry on 25th May 
1934, a date preceding the events by forty days. Prime Minister Ismet Inonu has been made 
officially aware of their unease. Secondly, when Ataturk goes to Dardanelle for the official 
visit of the Iranian Shah, “Crazy Salomon” personally relayed the situation to him. On July 
3rd, the community met with President Ataturk and explained him the gravity of the situation. 
Finally, two days later, Inonu demands the start of an investigation. Ten days after all this 
correspondence, Peker sent his circular to the RPP local administration. In the light of these 
data, it is improbable that Peker, in his position as general Secretary, was at that time unaware 
of these events. In all likelihood, the circular was for show, written and sent to shift blame.
The secret document written by the British Ambassador, and presented in Aktar’s book, 
reveals that the government decided upon the purging of Thrace of its Jewish content. Oral 
instructions have been placed to this end, and due to the officiousness of sport club 
administrators and the indiscretion of local authorities, the game, which was supposed to be 
played very gradually, has turned into a scandal.
Another British report detailed that recently established army units were to begin 
operations, the area was to become a military zone and therefore the region was to be cleansed 
of “undesired elements”.  Ataturk once told to his employee Hasan Rıza Soyak that he was 
not expecting an Italian attack from Antalya and then gains lands in Anatolia. Italians knew 
that it would not be good for them. But, if they decide to make a military operation to Turkey, 
they would firstly invade Albania and easily assure collaboration with Bulgarians, would then 
came to Straits and try to cut Turkey’s connection with the Balkans. Hence for Ataturk, we 
should expect the attack from Tracian Border, keep our eyes open and take our cautions due 
to the situation81. He was probably talking about the strategic need for re-arming the 
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demilitarized zones in Thrace and at the Straits. Later, Italy invaded Albania as Ataturk 
perceived.
Again, Aktar stresses that events in Thrace have to be analyzed within the context of the 
tension then inherent in Turkish-Italian relations. For the high administration, which was 
expecting hostilities from the Bulgarian border any time, Thrace was a prominently strategic 
zone. The Ninth Article of the Settlement Law passed around that time, authorized the 
Ministry of the Domestic Affairs “to scatter migrants who are not loyal to Turkish culture to 
towns (not in large numbers at a single place) and villages with predominantly Turkish 
cultural practices, and to move those suspected of spying away from the border inhabitations.” 
Mussolini’s speech on 18th March 1934 in which he expressed the historical targets of his 
country and mentioned Mediterranean as ‘Mare Nostrum’, raised the tension between two 
countries. He told that it was impossible to expand through North and West and underlined 
that Italy was the closest country among the European States to Africa and Asia. These 
aggressive expressions and later the Italian arming of the Aegean Islands convinced Ankara 
that Turkey was under threat. By these reasons, in 1934, Turkey left her introverted foreign 
policy and pursued policies such as joining to Balkan Pact.
On  July 14th, 1934, Government declared a manifest explaining that the events came 
out as the result of anti-Semitist feelings of people, which had started during the WWI and 
The Independence War. Furthermore, according to the manifest, there was a widespread belief 
for that Jews acted reluctantly in identifying with the Turkish culture and language, they 
threatened the security of Nation as they were spying; “These were all caused the sudden 
migration of Jews to Istanbul. But the government took all the precautions and there was 
nothing to be afraid of”. For Aktar, this was merely a proclamation of a denial showing the 
events just as an outcome of a marginal journal. But unfortunately, the events were occurred 
in government’s knowledge and direction82.
Cagatay Okutan83 makes emphasis on the establishment of the General Inspectorship 
(Umumi Müfettişlik) in Thrace, which was supposedly for public improvements. But 
interestingly, the government established these offices in East and then Thrace rather than the 
desperate Aegean and Middle Anatolia where Turkish population was dominant, in contrary 
to East and Thrace. Just two months later than the establishment of General Inspectorship, in 
14th June 1934, The Settlement Law was accepted84. Due to the 47th Article of the Law, the 
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inspectors were responsible at first degree from settling and becoming productive of the 
immigrants, refugees, and nomads. Hence, the connection between the General Inspectorship 
and the Settlement Law was ensured. Sukru Kaya explained the aim of the Law as ‘Making a 
homeland that speaks same language, thinks same, and feels same’. In other words, they 
wanted non-Turks to forget their non-Turkishness within the Turks. For Ismail Besikci85, the 
central power also aimed to send the tribes (asiret), sheiks and aghas together by taking their 
family and property, in to exile.
On  June 21st, 1934 the law came into force and few days later the events in Thrace have 
started. Majority of Jews were living there and the political elites frequently has showed their 
distrust against non-Muslims especially in the circumstances of war. Events started in 
Dardanelle on 24th June then spread to all Thrace within six days. Jews was forced to leave 
their homes and offices. On contrary to Aktar, Zafer Toprak86 and Okutan both believe that 
the government was not directly responsible for the events but acted neglectful. 
Aktar underlines the report written by the British Ambassador in Istanbul to Sir John 
Simon informing that the government had decided to transport the Jews from the region and 
the local executives who covet the properties of Jews that were in a hurry of survival, acted in 
violence and events became out of control. Whereas Okutan and Toprak argue that there was 
no need of a secret state operation, they could apply the law directly. But it is hard to believe 
that the events occurred because of a small group of people who were provocated by a 
marginal magazine and coincidently they were simultaneously affected with other people in 
the region.
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C) The Report of the Ninth Bureau 
A report that has been presented to the Party Secretariat and believed to have been 
prepared by a member of the 9th Bureau of RPP in 194487 efficiently summarizes RPP’s 
approach towards the minority issue. The report emphasized the necessity of systematic 
nationalist policy for the state and laid out the principles and measures for the makings of 
such policy.  The introduction contains statements resembling the general discourse of the 
single party period and first hand Kemalism: defining nationalism as the sole condition and 
tool for obtaining highest human qualities within the Turkish Nation. In the Party Programme, 
nation was defined as “the political unity that is formed by patriots binding each other with 
common language, culture and ideal.
The way to create a nation with “a single language and united around a single ideal” 
was by “raising a consciousness that all honor and blessing goes to those equipped with a 
complete sense of Turkishness and loyal to no other social sentiment than Turkism.” The 
report evaluated the non-Muslim minority with respect to RPP’s program. “These are not 
loyal to any of the three principles – language, ideal, culture- the Party Program brings forth, 
and they do not consider themselves as part of the Turkish community. Therefore they have 
not been satisfied with the general and inclusive guarantee of the Turkish state and have 
preserved the social organizations of their own community. Having lived with different 
languages, cultures and ideals for centuries their social constitution is of an entirely different 
make. Furthermore, not having participated in the establishment, growth or defense of the 
Ottoman Empire, they have no common history with the Turkish nation. Those with foreign 
state organizations have dedicated all their will to foreign national institutions and not the one 
they live within. That is why measures, which the Republic of Turkey has planned to take 
with good intent, have never been effective on them. Since they have lived with perpetual 
dualism at all ages in history and everywhere in the world, they have never blended with the 
central elements of the nation and have never expressed loyalty. Many times, their acts have 
been treacherous. Therefore, to demand from members of these communities the realization 
of united language, culture and ideal as expressed in the Party Program is to wish for the 
impossible.’ 
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The necessary measures to be taken to create a ‘united nation’, which the report 
suggested, were based on assimilation policies. Among these were: the fragmentation of the 
geography of nationalities to be assimilated and in that manner dispersion of the group; to 
make them economically dependent; intermarriages with other minorities whose assimilation 
has been fully established through said measures, etc. The report also stated that exile has 
taken care of the Armenian problem as exchange has taken care of the Rum problem; but 
Armenians have been returned to Anatolia in small communities. Armenians was trying to 
populate the area for political reasons. The suggested solution was to cleanse Anatolia of the 
Armenians, moving them to Istanbul where population growth could be controlled. The writer 
did not refrain from stating, “ In this fashion their reproduction rate can be reduced and when 
the problem is taken care of in the near future, a mass solution can be presentable.”
Reports of later dates prove the suggestion has been partially carried out. In 1935, there 
was a nationwide population of over 57,000 Armenian-speaking people, 39,000 of which 
lived in Istanbul. In 1950, this number was cut back to 52,000 with those living in Istanbul 
increasing to 42,000. Which signifies a substantial increase in Armenian migrations to 
Istanbul. As for the Armenians in Istanbul, since it was thought they could not be assimilated, 
it was proposed they were exchanged or their migration to other countries made easier. 
The Rums, on the other hand, no longer constituted a threat in Anatolia and Istanbul 
was the front where measures had to be taken. The aim: “The only thing to be said about this 
matter is to make Istanbul a place without a single Rum by the 500th Anniversary of the 
conquest of Istanbul.” Evidently, the ratio of the Rum population has been drastically reduced 
at a somewhat later date than planned, with a two-year delay (Events of 6/7 September, 1955). 
The ‘happy end’, however, came a decade later with the direct deportation of Rums in 1964.  
At this date, around 30-40 thousands of Rums have had to leave their country. Their numbers 
today total around 2,500 inciting us to mockingly question “which hotel they stay.” 
When one considers the particularly anti-Semitic sentiment at the time, what has been 
written about the Jews came as no surprise. “This element, which relies solely on a racial 
religion and having always lived in a perpetually closed tribal community, has never blended 
with any nation they have lived with. The Jew who has lived for two thousand years without 
sentiments such as loyalty to land and country which give a nation its highest pride and honor, 
has recognized the power of money as his sole aim.” The solution: first of all, to prevent their 
increase in the country through immigration, decrease their numbers by easing their way out 
of the country, ban their inclusion to state enterprises and undertakings in order to distance 
them from economic sources of profit. 
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Even before the report was written, the steamship Struma full of Romanian Jews fleeing 
Nazi occupation had reached Turkey and seeked refuge. After this plea was rejected and the 
steamship sank in the Black Sea, the declaration of Prime Minister Refik Saydam “Turkey 
will not be a heaven for people unwanted by all others” is representative of similar mentality 
at an earlier date. Although between the years 1935-1937, much publicized demands for 
refuge were liminally accepted, in 1937, many German Jews have been deported. Those 
accepted were done so with the consideration they would be ‘useful’ to the country. The 
Jewish population drops from 42,602 in 1935 to 35,786 in 1950. Their migration to Israel has 
not been stopped, in accordance with one of the propositions of the report. 
According to Bali, this report has been a confession that the Republican Project 
undertaken towards the end of the Single Party Regime of Turkifying the minorities and 
making citizens out of them has been a failure. But the report also mentions the imminent 
need to assimilate “non-Turk” people of all ethnicities. These have been categorized under 
four groups. The first group comprises of Muslim nationals living individually in scattered 
fashion, with their own native languages. These people of Circassian, Georgian, Albanian, 
Pomak and Bosniack origin are being blended into the society through intermarriages and 
cultural evolution. Still, the rate of this blending is not deemed sufficient; their loyalties to 
their origins impede this change. In the second group are Muslim nationals living in small 
groups, with their own native languages. Laz, Circes, Georgian, Albanian, Bosniack and 
Pomaks were again considered to be of this group. Since they live in groups, they preserve 
their cultural fabric and constitute a threat.
During the War of Independence, with reference to the Aznavur uprising, it has been 
pointed out that these minorities were a permanent threat whenever the state is weak. In 
propositions typically sparkling with intelligence the writer suggested that the Laz population 
be moved away from border towns to inlands, that their collective existence be interfered 
with, or that Turks move into their towns and schools speedily established. Those in the third 
group are Arabs totaling a number of around two thousands and who live in the South. These 
are especially prone to foreign provocations and therefore have to be dealt with sensitively. It 
was proposed that they are sent to Iraq or Syria through exchange or any other means. 
The Kurds in the East and Southeast are the fourth group and their numbers were listed 
as around 1.5 million. “No matter what their race or previous nationalities are, we do not 
share with them the unity of language which is the most basic requisite of national unity. One 
needs to address this reality clearly and explicitly. To hide the truth behind expressions like 
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Mountain Turk, or the Highland Turk is only harmful in the long run and no matter what their 
history may be, it is not possible to convince them or anyone else that these are Turks.”
According to the report, unlike (!) other communities, much more effective precautions 
needed to be taken for the Kurds. This discourse was quite different from the evidence of 
official discourse. This may stem from the fact that the report was highly confidential and 
therefore reflective of innermost thoughts, but the writer said “let us not deceive ourselves”, 
emphasizing the need to accept (not recognize) the Kurdish reality and take due precautions. 
Foremost among these precautions was to cease treating the region as ‘far away.’ The next 
proposition was to move a condensed population of Turks into the area to Turkify the area. 
But as this re-population takes place special care has to be given to ensure the Turkish 
population is economically better off and more cultivated than their Kurdish counterparts. To 
that end, Turks from Bulgaria or Romania or Kashkais from Iran are suggested as immigrants. 
The nomadic mode has to be changed for purposes of assimilation. The cradle of assimilation 
must be towns and cities and their marketplace has to be Turkified. In this process it is crucial 
that roads are constructed, that educators are Turks – their native language Turkish—and the 
Turkish language is thoroughly taught. 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the report is that those who were ‘non-Turks’ 
despite being Muslims are considered possible threats and the need for assimilation is 
expressed for them as well. The report places at most importance to unity of language rather 
than of religion. But Rıfat Bali88 asserts that the component of religion is the main line of 
tension for Turkish society. The founders of the Republic unanimously agree on the benefit 
and necessity of religious or even racial unity. The acceptance of Civil Law in 1926 and the 
removal of the statement “The official religion of the state of Turkey is Islam” from the 1928 
Constitution does not change the fact that the prevalent component on Turkishness is that of 
sharing the same religion (or even sect.)
Turkey’s approach towards the Jews escaping from Europe during the WWII
Bali mentiones that the historical truth about the Jews who escaped toTurkey during the 
Second World War was passed over and covered. Turkey, rather than being a “safe shelter” 
for the Jews that were escaping from the genocide, had just opened her borders to the ones 
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that were needed. After Hitler came to power in 1933, a new period was begun in the world 
and in Turkey. As a result of his anti-semitist policy and boykott against Jews, life became too 
dangerous and unbearable in Germany especially for the Jews. So they began to search for the 
opportunities of migrating the other countries like Turkey. But Turkey acted so selective in 
accepting the Jewish immigrants. She did not give permission to the Jewish doctors who 
wanted to migrate from Berlin and she showed the law that bans the foreign people making 
their business as the reason. The principal of the Jewish High School David Markus 
recommended Inonu to let thousands of Jewish doctors and pharmacists come to Turkey but 
he is rejected by the same reason. Ataturk’s dentist Sami Gunzberg, gave information about 
the anti-semit policies of Hitler and the outcomes to Ataturk, so he gave permission to some 
scientists in a limited amount. Just for the need of scientists in the Istanbul Technic 
University, fifty-eight German scientists were allowed to come and work here. 
In 1938, government legislated two laws one after the other and took measure against 
Jews coming from the Nazi Germany, restricted their enterence to Turkey. According to the 
fourth article of the ‘Passport Law’; even they come Turkey to pass in transit, they must have 
enough money and visa of the countries they go. The second law made evaluation on the base 
of ‘being related with Turkish race’ about the persons in foreign nationality and whether they 
would be deportated or not. Haim Weizmann, the president of Sohnut, and Moşe Şertok met 
with Turkish goverment officials and in return of accepting 200,000 Jewish people, they 
offered foreign credit. They could not make a deal but Turkish government considered the 
offer.
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D) Anti-Semitist Wave in Turkey during the WWII
Oran states that usually, the internal order defines the foreign politics or at least gives 
a general shape. But it is valid for ordinary times and for medium-long periods, whereas in 
extraordinary and short periods, international environment effects the internal order and war is 
in this cathegory. Although Turkey did not participate the Second World War, She was deeply 
effected in various ways. Capital Tax, especially in it’s application process, showed that 
Turkey was seriously influenced by the racist atmosphere of international environment. In 
contrast to the common knowledge, Turkey was not neutral in the Second World War but 
stayed as non-belligerent. The strategy was like flirting with both sides. These were the times 
that press was greatly under pressure and when the Germany was in advantage, interpretators 
of newspapers were praising Germany and the Turkish racist movement intensely. Fascist 
Germany regarded Turkey, Iran and Arabic ststes as rich and cheap raw resources. She also 
wanted to enter Near East in order to get possibility to attack Soviet Union from its South. 
Thus Germany tried to take Turkey under its influnce through economic and political ways. 
For this target Hitler charged Ribbentrop for external propoganda89. The basic direction of 
propaganda in Turkey was anti-communizm. They frequently emphasised ‘the weapon 
broderhood’ between Turkey and Germany during WWI. 
By the great and secret financial support of Germany, racist movement was getting 
stronger. With the direction of Ribbentrop, five million golden Marks sent to Von Papen in 
order to support their ‘friends in Turkey who were in bad economic condition’. Turkey and 
Germany had meeting about organising the Turks in USSR. Besides, the man who said “we 
are Turks, Turkists and will always stay as Turkists. For us, Turkism as well as being a matter 
of blood, is also a matter of conscience and culture” and who prepared the law of Capital Tax, 
was the prime minister Sukru Saracoglu. 
The Struma Steamship
Some Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution in the Balkans were allowed to make their 
way through Turkey especially when the British mandatory authorities in Palestine provide 
them immigration certificates. But others were turned back. But the most tragic story occurred 
in the Struma Steamship Disaster, carrying refugees of Romanian Jews and taking them to 
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Palestine illegally. The motor of Struma breakdown and it arrived Istanbul in December 1941, 
putted in quarantine, no one allowed to go to ground and stayed there for more than two 
months. 
Although the conditions were miserable, no enough food left, and some people needed 
medical care, Turkish officials did not give permission as they doubted that the real aim of 
those the refugees were to stay in Istanbul instead of Palestine. Because of the pressures, the 
British Ambassador who denied giving immigration certificates to Palestine to, declared that 
they gave permission to seventy children to go there, but Turkey did not let them leave the 
steamship and refused to negotiate with Britain about the subject. Finally, the steamship 
towed back into the Black Sea where it was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine. Only one of the 
769 refugees survived. The Turkish Press did not interested with the subject since from the 
beginning, only Vatan newspaper mentioned under the title of ‘the Uninvited Guests’. But it 
caused great sorrow in all around the world particularly in Palestine. The Tel Aviv 
Municipality declared mourning, called entartaintment places to be closed. 
Dismissal of Jews from Anadolu Agency
Anadolu Agency (AA) announced the mourning event in a telgraph and Ulus 
Newspaper gave place to this news. A month later while the discussion was going on about 
the extra fund for Anadolu Agency, the Dardanalle Reputy Ziya Gevher Etili90 harshly 
criticised the Agency and said that AA gave this zionist propoganda to the newspapers and 
although the government gave food to people in Struma, AA argued that  the conditions were 
awful in the steamship. So Etili told that he was against the payment of the extra fund to AA 
and he emphasised that recently the agency started to be like an international formation as the 
half of the employees were non-Turkish, Jewish, Rum ‘even Spanish and American’. He 
recommended Prime minister to clean the agency as it would be a work of his ‘clean hands’. 
Prime minister Refik Saydam responded that as “...AA may need an improvement... may
contain some persons in various ways... we did our best for Struma, we have no material or 
moral responsibility. Turkey can not serve as a homeland for the unwanted people, this is our 
way therefore we could not let them stay in Istanbul. Unfortunately, they became victim of an 
accident.” 
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After a while, in 4th May 1942, Refik Saydam practised that ‘improvement’ and 
ordered to all the Jewish officers to quit their jobs in AA. For Johannes Glasneck91, the 
number of those People was twenty six and after long discussions within government the 
decision made. Germany found this step as an success of the anti-Semitist provocations they 
did in Turkey. German Ambassador in Ankara explained Germany that they hoped cleaning 
AA from the Jewish elements that were close to the enemy, would have positive impact on the 
distribution of news. The names of the Jews were decided by Refik Saydam, then he 
published a circular that declared the employees in restaurants and hotels would not also work 
there anymore. But only the artists and musicians effected by this circular.
The Conscripting of Twenty Reserve Units
By the end of 1940, the Axis Powers gained advance in Balkans and that disturbed 
Turkey alot. The participants debated a meeting of RPP potential measures that would be 
necessary in the case of Turkey enters the war and if Istanbul comes under occupation92. 
Kazım Karabekir stressed the possibility of espionaging for the Axis forces by the minorities 
whom he pronounced as “People that suck the blood of the Turks”. Thus he proposed sending 
those ‘bloodsuckers’ to the Anatolian interior and resettling the Turkish Muslim population in 
their places. The decision have not taken at that time but when Nazis occupied Yugoslavia in 
April moving closer to Turkey’s Western borders, government began to make preparations for 
such a German invasion. Inhabitants of Thrace and Istanbul were sent to Anatolia, while even 
foreign governesses were expelled from the country on the fear that they might act as a ‘fifth 
column’ for the enemy.
Consequently, non-Muslim men between the ages of 20-45 were conscripted into 
reserve unit in the middle of May 1941. They were not given weapons training but they just 
ordered to work in road repairement. Minorities were restless because of the ambuiguty of 
future rather than the working conditions. Sergents and officers were harassing them by 
shouting “You Jews! Forget about Istanbul and returning to your wives and children.” Bali 
argues that there were two reasons for not giving the non-Muslims weapon. First, by carrying 
the bad memories of the occupation of Istanbul, they wanted to prevent them, especially the 
Armenians from acting as a ‘fifth column’ during an invasion or collaborating with the 
enemy. Secondly, by removing the non-Muslim businessmen and shopowners from their work 
                                                            
91 Glasneck : 1970 
92 Rifat Bali,“Yirmi Kur’a İhtiyatlar Olayı”, Tarih ve Toplum, November 1998, vol:179
61
for a long period of military service, government hoped to reduce their economic power. For 
the foreign press and people who lived that period, there was a third reason; the Nazi demand 
from the Turkish Foreign Ministry to collect the minorities in the camps and intern them.
German Army stopped at the Turkish-Greece border as they promised Ankara before. 
By the way, Jewish people were terrified as the Nazis came such close so lots of them in 
Istanbul looked for the ways to leave Turkey. In 18th June 1941, a non-aggression treaty is 
signed between Turkey and Germany, according to the American resources93, after than, Nazi 
spies started to act more freely in Turkey. They were collecting datas about the situations and 
wealth of Turkish Jews and Turkish Police was aware of that. The Nazist propoganda 
activities were increased after the treaty. Turanist and Pan-Turanist writings increased in press 
particularly those of, Reha Oguz Turkkan, Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sançar involving an anti-
Semitist attitude.
During the years of WWII, the students had to be a member of ‘The original Turkish 
race’ to be accepted by the military schools. According to Nihal Atsız, a famous Turkish 
racist, it was applied in the period of Marshall Fevzi Cakmak94 for the safety of Turkey and to 
prevent further betrayels of minorities to Turkey, as they did at past95. Also in the first 
department of Istanbul Chief of Police, the desk of race is founded. The task of desk was to 
determine the race of families of those police and military students. 
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E) The Capital Tax Levy
The Capital Tax Law is, as Bali states, one of the most important laws in Turkish 
financial history that caused enormous trauma in those subjected to it through its 
discriminatory and arbitrary imposition. During the 1930s and the Second World War, world 
economic conditions and the ideological atmosphere shifted to favor anti-liberalism and a 
state-directed economy. Thus these circumstances facilitated the process for capital 
accumulation came under the full control of the state. Besides, the influence racist theories of 
Nazis reinforced the policy of discrimination against the non-Muslim minorities. 
As I stressed before, in the Ottoman Empire, much of the country’s trade and 
manufacture had been in the hands of foreigners and indigenous Christians and Jews. After 
1908, and particularly during the WWI, the CUP implemented a ‘National Economic Policy’ 
that favored Turkish businessmen. The nationalization of economy policy pushed forward 
under the republic, by the law of 1932 banning foreign nationals from the exercise of most 
trades and sectors. Turkish youth who had no non-agricultural occupational experience other 
than that of a state bureaucrat or a soldier, now desired to become active in the economic life 
of the new Turkey with the fuelling victory of Independence War. Thus the minorities, in 
Bali’s word96 “who had learned trade instead of ‘fighting for homeland’ were looked upon as 
competitors and even enemies 
The intention of the law, which was similar to legislation taken in other countries during 
the war, was to tax the excessive profits earned by those taking advantage of the difficult 
wartime conditions from black market dealings, price speculating and hoarding. Shortages 
and a rising public deficit led to an extreme rise in consumer prices while the public anger 
targeted hoarders and speculators, which identified with the non-Muslim businessmen. Under 
these circumstances government introduced a capital levy as a measure to force the wealthy to 
shoulder a proper share of wartime hardship97.  Such law could be legitimate, if it hadn’t 
imposed on foreigners, non-Muslim citizens and those of converted at far greater rates of 
payment than Muslims of equal wealth. 
In November 1942 GNP accepted the Capital Tax Law. By the expression of the head of 
the financial department98 Faik Ökte, the aims of Capital Tax were; “1) To find financial 
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resource for state,  2) To pull money from the market thus prevent the inflation, 3) To absorbe 
the extreme profit of stockbrokers and black marketeers among the minorities by heavy taxes. 
It is taken from the untaxed income and wealth for once and can not be objected or appealed”. 
According to the law, after fifteen days, tax would be collected, if the obliged persons does 
not pay within thirty days, they would get arrested, send to the working campings or without 
any right of sueing their properties can be sequestred and sold. 
Although the word “non-Muslim” have not been expressed in the text of the law, the 
application especially targeted non-muslims. As a result, non-Muslims paid ten times and 
converteds (Sabetaists) paid two times of the Muslims. Moreover, Jews who escaped from the 
occupied Europe subjected to tax in same ratio with the non-Muslims. The commission that 
was established to assess the tax divided up the tax prayers into four groups: Muslims 
(signified by an ‘M’), Non-Muslims (G-Gayri-Müslim), Converteds (D-Dönme) and 
Foreigners (E-Ecnebi).  
 All the commissioners were selected from the Muslim RPP members Capital Tax is one 
of the typical example of the anti-minority attitude of the Turkish Republic. The tax was 
assessed in an entirely arbitrary and discriminatory fashion and on the basis of no objective 
criterion. It can be called as economic genocide99 because the intention was about destroying 
the existence of minorities in economy so that Turks could take on the control of the market 
and trade. All the ones who could not pay the tax at a given time (1400 people), sent to Aşkale 
Working Campings to broke stone where the climate conditions were too harsh. According to 
the ‘Ulus’100 newspaper, they would be put to work constructing roads in Elazıg, Diyarbakır, 
Van, Bitlis, Erzurum and Agrı and clearing snow in Kop, Zigana and Devebolu. Half of the 
wage paid to them was to be calculated against their tax obligation. Unsuprisingly, they were 
all non-Muslims and the majority were Jewish. On the other hand, people afraid of missing 
the payment time, sold their offices, houses, personal things in the time that the prices of 
immovable properties fastly degreased101. The buyers were the Muslim traders and Anatolian 
notables who made capital accumulation during the war. 
Ökte explained that the revenue brought in to the treasury from the Capital Tax was 
about 221 million TL but the amount of damage was great in the sense of state-citizen 
relations. Non-Muslims’s mistrust against the state was reflected in the generations-old folk 
saying of the Turkish Jewry: “Ni mujer de la Romanya ni mülk en la Turkiya” meaning; 
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neither get a bride from Romania nor property in Turkey. The expectations that the new 
Democrat Party (DP) Government would return the tax amounts that had been unfairly 
collected from Non-Muslims or an apology from state did not come true. Instead, all of the 
DP’s pre-election promises about ‘recompense for the Capital Tax’ turned out to be just a part 
of election propoganda against RPP. As a result, the Capital Tax left its mark on the 
development of the country as the Turkish-Muslim mercantile middle class became more 
numerous and richer and nearly half of a Jewish community (80,000 in 1945) left Turkey for 
Israel, when the state was founded in 1948. Greece, which was in the middle of a civil war, 
and Soviet Armenia under Stalin’s dictatorship, did not attract many Greeks and Armenians 
from Turkey. But some of them made their way to the US.
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III)Practices Against Minorities After the Transition to the Multi-Party 
System
The decision of transition to multi-party system in Turkey, was an important milestone 
for the minorities. By the foundation of the Democrat Party in 1945, the long single power of 
RPP had ended and the transition to multi-party realised. Expectations were naturally in a way 
that to parallel with democratization of country, the policy against minorities would be 
liberalised. Actually, some improvements in the minority policy was made. From now on, 
there would be more than one party, thus the votes of the non-Muslims particularly in Istanbul 
gained importance. The non-Muslim propotion of election was about one of third at that 
date102. By the elections of 1946, power party started to take steps to please the non-Muslims. 
At that period, through few legal changes the permission was given of  carrying gun, being 
reserve officer and also to be a member of RPP103.  In 1948, RPP wanted Istanbul District 
Inspector Sadi Irmak to prepare a report about the problems of the Rum community. A 
lawyer, Kaludis Laskaris who was a member of RPP, also communicated the problems of 
Rums to the party center. 
Thus, the election triumph of DP in the spring of 1950 caused an optimistic climate 
among non-Muslims, as they expected a reflection of DP’s liberal policies on minorities. At 
first DP took a tolerance approach against non-Muslim minorities. But than, it was realised 
that DP did not have an attitude that much different than RPP. Non-Muslims once again 
became the second-class citizen. DP’s initial liberal policy which just remained in appearence 
was infact planned by regarding the foreign policy and party tactics. When the discussions of 
Cyprus became harsher, DP’s good intentions towards non-muslims were totally abolished. 
But Dilek Güven points that the 6–7 September Events can not be explained as a retaliation to 
Cyprus policy of Greece, whereas Rıdvan Akar defends the reverse. Ironically, despite the 6-7 
September Events, DP again got the mass support from minorities in the 1957 Elections. The 
most important factor was the fear against power of RPP and the antipathy against Inonu.
The Greek minority had a special position with compare to other non-Muslim 
minorities in the minds of the founders of the new Turkey. They were seen as the 
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collaborators with the invaders, and traitors. Other difference of Rum community was derived 
from the ‘reciprocity’ principle that took place in 45th Clause of Lausanne Treaty. The 
essence of the policy towards minorities during the single-party period was first, to make 
them leave and second to turkify the remainings. In this term, this policy was most 
unsuccesful on the Rum minority. The most important reason was the tradition of a strong 
nationalist education system of Rums that was developed by the second half of 19th century. 
The other reason was that they were advantaged with the existence of a state, Greece, that 
cares about them and the possibility to migrate there when it is necessary.
For centuries the issue of respective minorities influenced relations between what are 
now present-day Turkey and Greece. But that causal link was reversed in 1923, since the 
relations between two countries have been greatly determined the lives of the two countries. 
Both political leadership were busy with developing a homogeneous national states. As Aktar 
argues, this common tasks on their agenda provided the basis of rapprochement between two 
countries in the 1930s. For two decades Greece and Turkey had friendly relations. The etablis 
matter and other bilateral problems were settled in 1930 by the Ankara Convention. Common 
fears against the Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ policy of Mussolini in the 1930s and the Stalinist 
policy of the Soviet Union in the 1940s helped for further detente in relations. 
By the Culture Agreement of 1951, the exchange of teachers for minority schools in 
both countries were decided and a promised made to purify school textbooks from ‘mutual 
defamation concerning both nations moral values’. Meanwhile in Turkey, many Greek 
citizens who were born in Istanbul and left in 1922, started to came back in 1930 with 
working permits. In Greece for the first time in 1954, the minority school’s offical name 
changed from Muslim to Turkish by the ‘Papagos law’. Thus Turkey and Greece started to be 
the closest partners in the Balkans.
The Cyprus Problem
The history of the conflict includes a militant confrontation with British imperialism, a 
set of treaties giving a limited form of independence, the breakdown of that constitutional 
structure, interference of the Greek and Turkish "motherlands" and the major powers, a Greek 
coup d'etat and the Turkish intervention that divided the island as it is today, and fitful 
attempts to negotiate a just settlement were the crucial features in the background of 
communal violence, terrorism, and intimidation.  
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Since gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1831, Greece claimed 
Cyprus due to its majority Greek population. Indeed, the new monarch was styled "King of 
the Hellenes" to emphasize sovereignty over Greeks everywhere. Enosis (union) with Greece 
was also the aspiration of Greek Cypriots. In 1915 Britain offered to cede Cyprus to Greece in 
return for their entry into the war against the Central Powers, but Greece considered the price 
too great as they expected a German victory. This war-time offer by Britain also raised 
Cypriot expectations since it invalidated the previous British argument that Cyprus was leased 
from the Turks and would revert to them when the British departed. When Britain made 
Cyprus a Crown Colony in 1925, the political campaign for enosis intensified. Serious riots in 
1931 were suppressed by the British authorities. 
The Greek Orthodox Church led the enosis movement, and after the Second World 
War and Archbishop Makarios III personified it. In 1951, he secretly invited Cypriot-born 
retired Greek Army colonel Georgios Grivas to form EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion 
Aghoniston, National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) as the military wing of the enosis
movement. British ministerial statement that Cyprus would never be granted independence 
and the United Nation’s refusal to consider the Cyprus question increased the actions of  
EOKA through a terrorist and propaganda campaign. The first EOKA bombs exploded on the 
1st of April 1955 which lasted in 1959 and caused the death of more Greek Cypriot civilians 
than the total of British killed. It created civil strife and mistrust between the two Cypriot 
communities. The British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden104, underlined that “EOKA 
received direct support from Greece in money, arms, organization and propaganda. Greek-
speaking Cypriots were awed by EOKA terrorists and subject to bombardment by Athens 
radio.” On the other hand, after Turkey became a third power in the Cyprus issue, Turkish 
community in Cyprus took action and founded ‘Cyrus is Turkish Party’ and organization of 
resistance called ‘Volkan’.105
At conferences in Zurich in 1958, London in 1959 (codified as the Treaty of Guarantee 
in 1960), the two Cypriot communities, Britain, Greece and Turkey came to a compromise: 
the independence of Cyprus with a Greek president Makarios, a Turkish vice president Rauf 
Denktas, 70:30 Greek-Turkish representation in parliament and government services, and a 
prohibition on union with Greece or any other state. Britain, Turkey and Greece served as 
guarantors of the settlement, with a small number of troops on the island. Britain also retained 
two Sovereign Base Areas. 
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A) Events of 6–7 th September 1955 
The intensity of the negative attitude shared by both Turkey and Greece towards their 
minorities were their common feature. Especially after 1955s, when the Cyprus question, 
came to poison Greco- Turkish relations further. After the WWII, the Greek-Ortodox 
majority’s efforts to unite with Grecee were increased. This policy or ideal was called 
‘Enosis’. However, these efforts were neglected by the RPP Government but the public 
opinioun had already started to discuss the condition of Turkish minority in Cyprus. In 
newspapers government was critised for acting passively, student demonstrations were made 
to take attention on the issue. Neverthless, the Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak made a 
speech in the GNA and explained that: “There is not an issue called Cyprus... because the 
island is under the control and sovereignty of Great Britain. As we know for so long, Britain 
does not have any idea of transferring her rights to another power and had never showed such 
tendency.”106
After DP came to power in 14th May 1950, the passivist attitude was continued. For 
the politicians the friendly relations with Greece that developed after 1930s, should be 
protected despite the events in Cyprus. Again, the new Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü 
answered the questions of Greek journalists as “There is no issue called Cyprus107.” But when 
the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos explained Greece’s demand on Cyprus, the silence was 
ended. Than the Köprülü gave a speech about that “Turkish Government would not let 
violation of her rights”. 
Turkey and Greece’s participation into NATO in 1951 and military cooperation (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the foundation of Balkan Pact decreased the importance of 
conflicts in Cyprus for a while. But then again, new Greek government repeated her demand 
for enosis in 1953. Thus, the Cyprus question was first taken to the United Nations by Greece 
with the demand for self-determination in 1954. The demand was grounded by stating that 
Cyprus, as an ancient Helenistic settlement area, was inside Greece’s cultural effect region 
and the political stability of East Meditarrenean was under threat because of Britain’s attitude.
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The Role of Britain
One of the most surprising facts was the interference of Britain into the issue within 
the context of Cyprus question which Güven gave place in her study. Britain had made efforts 
in 1954 and 1955 to change Turkey’s policy of being neutral towards Cyprus and to get 
Turkey on it’s side despite the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 in which Turkey had 
renounced all rights to Cyprus. Britain successfully pressured Turkey to change its neutral 
position and support Britain in the UN and at the Tripartite conference in London. In a British 
Foreign Office memorandum of September 14 1954, at a time when Greece was bringing its 
appeal for self determination for Cyprus to the UN and the British were courting Turkey to 
change its neutral stance on Cyprus, a British official stated: “A few riots in Ankara would do 
us nicely."
After Greek-Ortodox majority in Cyprus demanded Enosis- meaning the annexation to 
the Greek mainland- Britain decided to make a conference in London that would continue 
from August to September 1955. The reasons to organize such a Tripartite conference was to 
ease the increasing tension between ethnic groups in Cyprus and to strenghten the position of 
Turkey thus accusations against Britain for pursuing colonialist aims would be weaken. 
British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan told Turkish Foreign Ministry that “If Turks put 
their claims as sharply as they can at the beginning of the conference, that would be in interest 
of both Britain and Turkey.” Accordingly, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu with his encourage 
fuelled by Britain, explained his governments view in an unusual manner: “...If the status of 
island would change, and Britain would give sovereignty rights to another, than it should be 
Turkey who was the real owner of the island. Because the island had been under Ottoman 
control for 400 years and had never been ruled by Greece, furthermore Cyprus was a part of 
Anatolia”108 The only reason that prevented Greece delegates from leaving the conference 
was that it would carry on bilaterally as Macmillan offered. 
Meanwhile the Cyprus question had became an international issue and also dominated 
the Internal Affairs of Turkey. Menderes’s government which was in the middle of a political 
and economic crisis wanted to direct Turkish public focusing on the Cyprus Issue. Press was 
taking the question as ‘a National case’ of Turkey and anti-Enosis campaigns were organised. 
Suspicions of the Rum Ortodox minority had already been greatly reinforced when 
Archbishop Makarios became the symbol of the Greek unionist movement in Cyprus. As the 
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Cyprus crisis deepened, Rum minority was used as a national scapegoat. Anti-Greek 
sentiment came to a head during the riots of 6-7 September109. 
On 6-7 September 1955, Turkey gained a black page in her history which she would 
not want to remember and think of again. The ‘street demonstrations’ in reaction to Cyprus, 
soon turned into widespread vandalism and violance in which the subjects were the non-
Muslims, particularly Rums. This event was organised by the Cyprus is Turkish Association-
ATC (Kıbrıs Türktür Derneği), and realised together with the student, youth associations and 
trade unions. But it was planned by the government of Democrat Party. 
An evening paper called Express, published in Istanbul, made two consecutive prints 
on 6th September 1955110, denouncing the sinister attack on the house where M.K. Ataturk 
was born in his hometown of Salonika, Greece. Late in the afternoon on same day, a newly 
created group called Cyprus is Turkish invited everyone to retaliate against the Greeks who 
wanted to annex the island and had not refrained from defiling Turkey's hero's sacred 
homestead. From its original epicentre in Taksim Square, the trouble rippled out during the 
evening through the old suburb of Pera, the smashing and looting of Greek commercial 
property being executed, British Consul-General, Michael Stewart reported111, 'With a method 
and determination which would have done credit to any thorough-going barbarian'. The 
Turkish Police were not only largely passive towards this destruction, but discriminated in the 
protection which they afforded to Western Ambassies. 
Over the next two days and nights mobs raided the homes and workplaces of non-
Muslim minorities in Istanbul and Izmir, leaving behind 16 dead and dozens of wounded 
citizens of Greek origin, 73 devastated Greek Orthodox churches and damaging one 
synagogue, eight chapels and two monasteries. Some 5,538 properties were sacked, burnt and 
destroyed, of which 3,584 belonged to Greek citizens of Turkey. Between 50-200 women 
(varying according to who has reported it) were physically violated, raped. In Izmir, the Greek 
Consulate and the Greek pavilion at the Izmir International Fair were set on fire by arsonists; 
14 homes and five shops were destroyed and ransacked. Some graves of Greek citizens were 
destroyed as well. The excuse was ready, ‘They started it and we paid them back.’According 
to an official Turkish source112, 4,214 houses, 1,004 workplaces, 26 schools and other 5,317 
establishments such as factories, hotels, pubs etc were attacted. According to an American 
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source, 59 percent of the attacked workplaces and 80 percent of damaged houses belonged to 
Greek-Ortodox people.
The government hoped for help of these attacks in the ongoing London Conference on 
Cyprus. Being unaware of the conspiracy plotted by Turks, Greek Foreign Minister 
apologised for the bomb attack in Salonika, but Zorlu blamed Greeks on account that their 
provocative Cyprus policies led to the attacks. Turkish delegation called back by Menderes, 
they left London on 8th September.
Consequently, Turkey became the third power in the Cyprus conflict hence for Güven, 
the continuity of the status qou- British domination over the island became probable. Another 
British advantage gained by the Events of 6–7 September was the change in US policy of 
Cyprus. When Greece declared that they would bring Cyprus conflict into UN again in the 
spring of 1955, US Ambassador Lodge’s anti-colonial ideas in UN were well acknowledged 
by British government and US government was tended to support Greek claims. On 23rd 
September 1955, US voted against the inclusion of Cyprus issue in UN agenda pointing the 
threats over liberal world order and NATO union. Finally, British achieved its target that 
Cyprus issue was prevented to be debated in UN.
Government’s Role
Baskın argues the government expected that the demonstrations would show the 
public support for the Cyprus issue but the mob ran free, the police stood by and the 
demonstration turned into an operation of plunder and violance. The prime minister Adnan 
Menderes was tried after the coup detat of 1960, and later hanged by military-backed tribunal 
called Yassıada, which decided the bombing of Ataturk House in Salonica that triggered the 
events was planned by the Turkish secret police and the government of Menderes.
The Turkish Government blamed the ‘communists’ and the ‘traitor provocators’, 
though few found this convincing since undesirable socio-political activities were easily 
labelled as ‘inconspicuous communism’. Besides, the amount of communists were quite 
limited in Turkey at that time113. On 7th September, 48 persons considered as communists by 
the police were arrasted and brought in to Harbiye. Among them, famous writers and 
intellectuals were present such as Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir, Hulusi Dosdoğru, Tahsin Güzel, 
İlhan Berktay, Asım Bezirci, Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, Muzaffer Kolçak, Dr.Müeyyet Boratav, 
Dr.Can Boratav, Dr. Nihat Sargın etc. The reason for the quick arrestment of those was that 
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they had been following by the police for participating in left-wing activities. They had not 
been a part of the riots in anyway. There were lists of suspects that prepared arbitrarily by 
police, even the dead persons were included. As a matter of fact, police officers admitted that 
they had knew the innocence of those arresteds, but the order was given from top114. But the 
court cases resulted in favour of the defendants. The Events of 6–7 September used as an 
excuse for government to apply pressure over press, the opposition and the student movement.
It was an opportunity to keep the internal political developments under control. Without 
losing time, on 7th September Martial Law was promulgated in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara 
for six months and GNA was temporarily closed down. Actually, for a report of German 
Consulate General, 15 days before the attacks (24 August), martial law was already decided 
upon as the real aim was to restrict the freedom of opposition. On 7th June 1956, law code 
suggested by government to silence press with showing the justification of “they could 
depress country and promote crime”
The 'Cyprus is Turkish Party', led by the fanatical Hikmet Bil, had been a visible 
presence in the streets, but in British Consul-General, Michael Stewart's opinion115 it was not 
capable of the 'methodical destruction' involved. He blamed extreme nationalists in league 
with hooligan elements. As the dust settled, officials in the British Foreign Office had no 
doubt that Menderes and Zorlu 'knew all about the business' from the start, even if the riots 
had gone beyond what was originally intended. Their political purpose was to demonstrate 
unequivocally the seriousness of the Turkish claims over Cyprus. In this vein the actions were 
directed principally against Greece, but they were a vivid reminder, as well, to the British. 
It took a few years to learn the truth concerning who had perpetrated a mock attempt 
to bomb Atatürk's home and Turkish Consulate in Salonica. It was a Turkish student Oktay 
Engin, who later served in the intelligence community and ended his official career as the 
governor of Nevsehir. Engin was living in Salonika as part of Turkish minority in Greece and 
his education at Faculty of Law was covered by a scholarship provided by Turkish 
government. He was a National Security Service -MAH (Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri) member 
who was promised to get financial asistance and a position in return for his action. Through 
the personal orders given by Prime Minister Menderes and the Governor of Istanbul Fahrettin 
Kerim Gökay, he was placed to a position in the Municipality by the end of year 1956.
The news about the bomb attack to Ataturk’s house had not given in serious 
newspapers but only the boulevard newspaper Istanbul-Exspres that was printed extra-
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ordinarily on that day. Mithat Perin, whom was the editor of the newspaper had close relation 
with DP, was captured after the events but released two hours later by the personal order of 
Prime Minister Menderes. Perin’s collaboration with MAH became clear particularly after his 
letter written to MAH came out in 1960. He was demanding financial support for his 
newspaper in return to his attributions.
On 7th September 1955, eighty-seven members of the administrative commitees of 
KTC Istanbul branches, and persons who were in close relation with Kamil Önal, Hikmet Bil, 
Orhan Birgit, Hüsamettin Canöztürk were arrested. The unification of KTC branches was 
banned. But until the end of December they were all released. The judges of the Criminal 
Court No.1 decided the release of the accused. Presucator demanded the release on account of 
the importance of Cyprus as a Turkish Island and that provocative events against Turks in 
Greece and Cyprus led to these events. Court accepted that demand, on the basis of 
inadequate evidences provided by police, trials at the Court of Martial Law and the Civilian 
Court. Also the accused persons ‘did not have criminal intentions’. 
To sum up, the whole thing was a fabricated provocation to prove that there was 
public support behind the government of the day- headed by Adnan Menderes, whose 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu was negotiating with Greece and Britain for a fair 
settlement on Cyprus in the post-British era. When Zorlu was on trial for his life after the 
1960 Coup detat, it emerged from state records that he had telephoned Istanbul from London 
to say that “A little activity will be useful”; the similarity to language being used in the British 
Foreign Office “A few riots...will do us nicely” was clear. So, firstly, they wanted to create 
pressure over London Conference and then to take the attention away from the domestic 
political problems. But things went so wrong and got out of control where excited street 
demonstrations could serve the purpose of the government. 
General Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu admitted in an interview116 that “The events were the 
product of ‘special forces' and were an example of magnificent organization.” Indeed, the 
raging horde was not an ad hoc crowd that was spontaneously provoked. They were 
organized, equipped with thousands of clubs, axes, national flags and posters of Atatürk and 
were waiting for the news of the bombing to come out. They were also supplied with lists of 
names and addresses of non-Muslim minorities. Police just watched the devastation for two 
long days and did not help the victims, except a few personal exceptions117.
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The indemnity law was passed in the National Assembly on 26th Februrary 1956 in 
order to reimburse losses caused by the events of 6-7 September. The amount was only 60 
million TL. This was perceived as a gesture to please the international public opinion. 
According to the records of the German Consulate General, the reported economic damage 
was about 150 million TL.
The Events of 6-7 September caused a great migration wave of Rums, Armenians and 
Jews. It was a proof for them that they were not seen as a Turkish citizen and whoever comes 
into power this would not be changed. According to the official statistics, in the year of 1955 
the number of Jewish population in Turkey (speaking Ladino language) was 33,000 but in 
1960, it decreased to 23,000. In the same way, the number of Armenian speaking population 
was 70,000 in 1955 whereas it decreased to 56,376 in 1965. According to the American 
Consulate, the number of Christians was 270,000 in 1955, and 206,000 in 1965118. In other 
words, this gave the signal that the religious plurality in Istanbul came to its end. 
Mete Tuncay characterized the 6-7 September Events as ‘the expiration of the culture 
of empire and the beginning of ruralization’119. On the other hand, in GNP, Minister Fuat 
Köprülü told that the reason for the migration of non-Muslims was “To improve their living 
standards in other countries and to gain more economic success and wealth”. For Güven, the 
riots should be considered mostly with respect to the ethnic and religious homogenisation 
practiced by Kemalist elite for the building of a nation-state. Once again, non-Muslim 
minorities were forced to leave the country as a result of the destruction given to their life 
security and to movable and immovable property. But the Cyprus Issue had a bigger effect on 
the planning of the events if we consider the strategic importance of the time and place of the 
events.
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B) The Cyprus Crisis and Deportation of Rums in 1964
Inter-communal disturbances in Cyprus and the deterioration of Greek-Turkish 
relations during the 1960s had a direct impact on the Rum Ortodox community in Turkey. 
Conflict in Cyprus caused a Turkish reaction in 1964 which had serious ramifications for the 
Istanbul Rum minority. On 16 March 1964 Turkey unilaterally denounced the Greek-Turkish 
Convention of Establishment, although the right of these people to remain in their native city 
was guaranteed by the 1923 Lausanne agreement120. Aiming a retaliation against Greece, the 
Turkish Government cancelled the work and residence permits of 13,000 Rums who were 
living and working since the 1930 Ankara Convention. They were also Istanbul Rum etablis 
who had merely Greek citizenship. They were all expelled. Through various cautions taken by 
the State Treasury, the possessions of the Greek citizens were seized. Banks gave directions to 
not give credits to the enterprises that owned by Greek citizens.
Increasing Tensions in Cyprus 
During the dominance of the Cold War in 1950s, in Turkey Menderes and in Greece 
Papagos then Karamanlis were identified their national interest with the Western interests. US 
worried Soviet Union to advance a possible weakness in the south wing of NATO, so 
pressurred Turkey and Greece on the issues of Cyprus and to not enter in a military conflict 
with each other. But in 1960s, Cold War entered to a detente period, hence with moderation, 
the perception of threat coming from counter part lessened. As a result within both blocs 
nationalist and autonomous policies and internal disagreements gained importance like in the 
case of Turkey and Greece121.
After the Londra Treaty the first phase of Cyprus Question came to end and Turkey 
and Greece turned their attention to domestic developments. In Cyprus, an adaptation process 
was experiencing, therefore a stagnation occurred in the relations between two states. But the 
events of 1963, brought the subject to a multi-sided complex and internationalized surface. 
When Makarios turned to the island in 1 March 1959, made a speech in which he 
commemorated the EOKA martyrs and stated that freedom was not just a right and priviledge 
but also responsibility and mission. Meantime, Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk 
                                                            
120 Hülya Demir ve Rıdvan Akar (1994) “İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri”, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul,pp.64
121 Baskın Oran (2001) “Türk Dış Politikası”, İletişim, İstanbul, pp.716
76
Mukavemet Teşkilatı- TMT) who were regardad as hero by the public opinioun, was making 
preparations for a potential Greek attack. Despite the moderate attitude of 27 May rule and 
Ambassador Emin Dirvana, nationalist hawks, who were taking political key positions, 
prevent the formation of ‘Cypriotness’ and operating of the Constitutional mechanism. 
Dispute was mostly existing in the subjects of collecting taxes, forming arm forces, 
determining the participation portion to public services and borders of separate 
municipalities122. Thus, President Makarios prepared a 13 Article plan to change the 
ineffiecient structure of parliement but it was refused by Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun 
Cemal Erkin on the basis that it was restricting the freedom and rights of Turkish minority. 
These disputes were reflected on two communities and in both parts enosis and division 
(Taksim) defenders were gaining strenght. Both side were blaming each other for the 
unknown-resourced terrorist actions. Cypriot Turks were afraid of an attack from Cypriot 
Rums in similar fashion, Cypriot Rums were afraid of a military operation of Ankara.
Events started when a Rum police stopped the car of Turks and wanted to search it. 
Turks resisted and other Turks came to the place and a strife began between the police and the 
rest. Two Turks died, the police wounded and the conflict spreaded to every region that both 
communities live together. Rums isolated the Turkish villages and quarters and prevented 
them to get external help. In return, Turkish soldiers took control of the Lefkose-Gonyeli Line 
and prevent Rums getting in. Thus the Green-Line emerged which seperated Lefkose in to 
two and started the two separated de-facto rule in Cyprus. Cypriot Turks founded their own 
postal authorities, Turkish ministers did not participate to the council meetings and Turkish 
polices took off Cyprus epaulet from their uniforms. The economic embargo, legal restrictions 
and attacks of Rums took the attention of Turkish public opinion on the‘victims’;Turkish 
Cypriots. Meanwhile no diplomatic success was gained in the meetings.
Turkey declared her demand of Taksim, otherwise she would make a military 
operation to Island on the basis of right given by the guarantor treaty. On 25th December, 
Turkish jets planes flied on Cyprus by the order of Inonu to show their decisiveness. On 15th 
January 1964, Londra Conference brought the parts together again. Denktas told the Turkish 
suggestion for solution as: “1960 solution could not provide security of Turkish Cypriots and 
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there is a necessity for practical quarantees. Within this picture, the only solution is an 
establishment of a federal state with two-community that is seperated geographicly and made 
of a compulsory population exchange.” In other words, Turkey repeated her demand for 
Taksim. Klerides explained the approach of Greek Cyprus as: “The need for a preparation of a 
new Constitution which is suitable for majority’s interest and technically more practical.” As 
a result, establishment of order and security by NATO forces of 10,000 soldiers of under the 
command of a British officer was accepted by the representators of Turkey, Greece and 
Cypriot Rum but not by Makarios. Makarios was pursuing an independent and non-aligned 
foreign policy and was refusing an interference by NATO, instead he wanted to find a 
solution within UN in which SU could reflect her dominance together with Non-Aligned
countries.
After it became clear that within NATO no solution could be mutually accepted, 
Britain applied to UN Security Council on 15th February and the decision of UN intervention 
taken. UN Peace Force arrived on 14th March but the conflict did not ended. Both 
communities were arming by the help of Anatolia and Greece. On 4th April Makarios 
declared that he unileterally abrogated the Allience Treaty but Turkey did not recognise his 
decision. The tension in the Island was frequently increasing which was intensing the public 
pressure on Turkish government. 
Meantime, Inonu gave reaction to the attitude of Western allies and told that “A new 
world may be founded and Turkey takes her position in it” signalling a military interference. 
But infact Turkey was not ready for a military operation at that time as there were internal 
disturbances within the Turkish army, the coup detat attempts of the officer Talat Aydemir 
were suppressed twice. Inonu wrote a letter to US President Johnson giving the information 
that Turkey would make a military operation to Cyprus. Inonu expected US to not let a 
military conflict between allies thus Johnson would make pressure on Greece for solution. But 
in contrary, US gave a harsh answer with Johnson Letter (5th June) stating; if Turkey attacks 
Cyprus then she would be alone against a possible attack of SU. Furthermore, Turkey could 
not use American arms and equipments during her operation against Cyprus123. Consequently, 
Turkey gave up a military operation to Cyprus and started to question her foreign policy and 
relations with US. 
After the failure of the First Cenova Convention, a strife between Grivas forces and 
TMT in Erenkoy-Mansura started when Cyprus government wanted to cut the sea connection 
of Turks with the thought that weapons were coming from the Erenkoy Port. Rum forces of 
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National Guard Union- NGU blocaded Cypriot Turks and their life were in danger. On 7th 
August, again Turkish jet planes made a warning flight. But Grivas did not remove the 
blocade and strife continued so Turkish jets began to bomb the NGU. Thirty-three Rum died, 
230 person was wounded then UN Security Council called Makarios to make ceisefire and 
remove blocade. He accepted and war was prevented in Cyprus. Strifes124 left their place for 
the economic blocades of Rums against Turks. Inonu acted comprimisingly and moderate 
towards international public opinion in 1964 Cyprus Crisis whereas he practised the harshest 
policy on the Rum minority in Turkey. 
Effects on Rum Minorities
As the Cyprus conflict increased, Turkish public have turned their attention on 
Patriarchate, Rum citizens and Greek citizens in Turkey. ‘Citizen, speak Turkish’ campaigns 
and newspapers’s emphasis on the wealth of Rums were began to increase, so an anti-Rum 
athmosphere was created within public opinion. After realising that there would be no 
military operation on the island, Turkish government wanted to push Greece to make sacrifice 
in Cyprus subject. Therefore Ankara looked through her choices which to use as a trump card. 
First they thought to deportate the Phanar-Rum Patriarchate but they considered that it would 
take international reaction and Greece would be even pleased. So they focused on the Greek 
citizens. The father of the project was Inonu and the Turkish public opinion was suitable as 
there were lots of photos and stories of Cypriot Turks’s massacres. The arguments of ‘Rums 
in Turkey was directly supporting Makarios and Eoka’ spreaded. They were the figurans in a 
plan of pushing Greece in to a negotiation table in Turkey’s way. Whenever an attack or 
economic embargo was assurred on Cyriot Turks, Turkey started a new campaign or 
sanction125.
A proposal given to Istanbul Presidential City Council (Istanbul İl Meclisi 
Başkanlık Divanı) demanding Turcification of the Greek street names like Rumelifeneri, 
Rumelikavagı. Thus Galata became Karakoy, Samatya changed to Kocamustafapasa. The hill 
called Makarios in Buyukada also changed. Besides, the name of firms must, now on, take 
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Turkish names otherwise their license would be cancelled. Patriarchate was pressurred to 
make an explanation about the Cyprus events through in Turkish politics and expected to 
make a condemnation against Makarios. However, Patriarchate was underlying that they were 
a religious institution but not political. In media, journalist Ahmet Kabaklı wrote a serial of 
articles describing Rums as “Racist, chovenist, low, degenerated, representatives of evil etc.” 
He was indirectly suggesting a deportation three days before the decision of deportation:  
          
         “There is a matter of Greek-nationals in Turkey that none of us can tolerate... Based on 
the Treaty of 1930, more than 10,000 Rums are given rights of residence, trade, buying and 
selling property and export, which some of them are exempted from taxes. These priviledges, 
which I can not understand, are definately caputilations. According to the 16th Article of 
Priviledge Charter, ‘by only the reason of defense and security of the country’, these rights 
can be abolished... Having no aim other than destroying us, what are we going to do with this 
race”126
On 16 March 1964, with the same day of ‘Salvation of Istanbul from the enemies’s 
invasion’, Turkey unilaterally denounced the Greek-Turkish ‘Residence, Trade and 
Seyrisefanin Treaty’. At the same day, GNA was giving decision of authorising government 
for an intervention on Cyprus. Turkish press127, in general, gave positive reactions towards the 
decision of denouncing the Treaty. According to the 36th Article of the Treaty, the 
implementation of the renouncement decision would begin after six months. After six months, 
visa dates of those Rums with Greek passports would not be elongated hence they would 
leave Turkey. These six months also meant a time that was given to Greece to consider her 
Cyprus policy again and may be later they could renew the treaty. Inonu made an explanation 
stating that it was a normal precedure in order to provide renewal of the treaty and new 
policies and issues would be discussed.Greek Government also said that they were ready for 
new negotiations and renewal of the treaty. 
After the renouncement of treaty, news arrived Turkey that two Turkish villages were 
burned by EOKA and violent strifes were occurring. Grivas, the leader of EOKA, was 
materially supported by the Greek government. Consequently, Turkish government felt that 
they had to make Greece understand the seriousity, thus the sanctions begun. On 6th April 
Turkish government bilaterally renounced the Turkish-Greek Visa Agreement (1955) during 
the time of Pascalia. There were hundreds of Rums who went to Greece for visiting their 
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families, or participating into ceremonies. They could not come back. At the same day Turkey 
increased its territorial waters up to 12 miles and the Defense Minister underlied that “Now 
on, the distance between Turkey and Cyprus is decreased to seven miles”. In Later months, 
the Turkish-Greek Trade Agreement also renounced by Turkey.
Expulsion of Rums was totally indexed on the developments in Cyprus; when 
Makarios pronounced Denktas as ‘Rebel’ and took the arrestment decision, 3,000 Rums 
forced to leave Turkey. The 16th Article of the Treaty of 1930 indicating that ‘Decrees may 
not be practised in the situations that are related with the security of countries’ eased the work 
of Inonu government. They did not have to wait for six months to practise the decision of 
deportations. Thus, as a first step, government begun to determine the Greek nationals, for 
example, in Smyrna the number was 640. In Land offices, title deed transactions of Greeks 
were immediately stopped, the property right of Greeks was restricted. Financial Office 
started to search for the tax depths of Greek nationals. 
First 15 persons to be deportated with the reason of acting against Turkey were rich 
and old businessmen. Among those accusations, ‘founding secret organization, spying, 
transferring money abroad, collecting money for getting weaponry for Cypriot Rums, 
arranging spurious bill, etc’ were famous. Government gave first place to businessmen 
because of their economic power, so a nationalization process was taken. Government blamed 
people for membering an association called ‘Eleniki Enosis’ which was ‘helping the Cypriot 
Rums’. Eleniki Enosis was founded in the period of Ataturk-Venizelos approachment with an 
aim of improving cultural development and solidarity within the Rum community in Turkey. 
Last action of the assosiation was to organize a relief campaign for the eathquake occurred in 
Ionia Islands. Although 121 members were over seventy and twenty of them were over 
eighty, they were all deportated.
Before they leave the country, those Greek nationals had to sign a document at the 4th 
Police Department that includes an admission of illegal activities, being a member of Eleniki 
Enosis, sending money to Greek terrorists and lastly leaving Turkey by their own free will. 
They had no choice except signing the document as the 4th Department’s private cells were 
waiting for the ones who resist. On 17th April, Ministry of Finance demanded all banks to 
gave information of the amount of money in account of Greek nationals. In other words, their 
money would be blocaded128. After 7th May, Greeks could only take a limited amount of 
money under the control of the observers.
                                                            
128 Until Davos Summit, in 5th February 1988, this application had continued
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As a result 8,600 Greek nationals had to leave Turkey. They could only take 200 
Turkish Liras (22 dolars) and 20 kilogram baggage with themselves. Customs officers were 
checking the passengers for long hours. But consequently, the core of the Istanbul Rum 
community also left as they had intermarried with those from Greek community. The 
increasing tension of Cyprus and widespread anti-Greek climate also affected those with 
Turkish citizenship although Patriarchate Athenagoras called them not to leave129. In addition, 
education in Greek was once again forbidden in Gökceada and Bozcaada, and in 1965 many 
Rum properties were nationalised to build an open agricultural prison. Between 30,000 and 
40,000 members of the minority left Turkey within the years of 1964–67. Finally, Istanbul 
was almost emptied of its historical Rum community. In this way, plan that took place in the 
9th Bureu Report was almost completed. 
In return, to the deportation policy of Turkey, Greece started to deportate Turkish 
nationals from Dodecanese Islands. When Turkey took decision of giving permission to 1,134 
Greek nationals with humane reasons, Greece let 500 Turks to stay in Rhodos. In long-term, 
Turkey damaged too much herself as she ended the reciprocity condition that came with 
Lausanne. Greece, now on acted more freely on her Eastern-Thrace Muslim minority. 
Especially after the ‘Cunta of the Colonels’ in Greece, lands of this minority were 
nationalised, Papagos Law was abolished, pressure of genderma increased in relation with the 
re-emerging events in Cyprus.
                                                            
129 Demir and Akar: 1994: pp.91
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C) 1936 Declaration and The Problem of Minority Foundation Properties
Lausanne Treaty had defined foundations as public property. Law of Foundation 
(Vakıflar Kanunu) came into force in 1936. All foundations were wanted a decleration of 
property showing the list of their immovable properties. The target of the regime was to take 
steps to dry the financial resources of the Islamists which were regarded as a threat to the 
secular regime. As a result of this law, many Islamic foundations lost their autonomy after 
they have governed by the General Directorate of Foundations. Minority foundations were 
also targeted. However, The Council of State gave the opinion that such practice would 
contravene the Lausanne Treaty. This law also demanded the trustees of the foundations to 
declare the sources of their income and how they would spend it. All minority foundations 
made these declarations in that period. These were the so-called ‘1936 Declarations’ which 
would have a huge impact on foundations. 
In 1938 the law of foundations was amended and the provision on the administration 
of foundations was changed. The clause reading that  ‘The foundations shall be governed by 
their elected bodies’ was omitted from the law. From then on, foundations were directed by 
government officials instead of councils they had selected themselves. In 1949, Law of 
Foundations was changed again. Foundations regained their former status in relation to their 
administration, and they could be governed by their elected councils again.
Turkish Intervention of Cyprus in 1974
After the “Coronel’s cunta” came to power in Greece, relations between Makarios and 
Atina were broken. Makarios wanted Grivas and his military forces to leave the island as he 
was trying to decrease the Greece pressure on himself. Coronels perceived Makarios as  
‘Castro of Cyprus’, so they wanted to get rid of him. They tried to assasinate him for three 
times but could not managed. Colonnels made Grivas returned to the island in 28th August 
1971, to form EOKA-B which was again committed to make Cyprus a holy Greek island and 
annex it with Greece. Makarios wrote a letter to Greece President General Gizikis demanding 
the collapse of EOKA-B. But in return, in 15th July 1974, Atina put her ‘Afrodit Plan’into 
practise: a coup detat attempt against Makarios. The Presidency House of Makarios was 
bombed, he hardly managed to save himself and escape. Meanwhile, Greek forces were 
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pointing that their action was not against the Turkish Cypriots. However, they declared a 
Hellenic Cyprus Republic and enosist Nikos Samson became president, so these were enough 
to disturbe Turkey and Cypriot Turks. 
Turkey considered Greece’s illegitimate military action as destruction of the 
constitution and this meant the violation of the treaties and guarantees. Only US did not 
condemned Greece government and Samson130, rest of the world was standing against Greece 
just as Turkey expected for so long. Under these circumstances, the Turkish army intervened 
Cyprus on 20 July 1974, announcing that the invasion was a ‘peace-keeping operation’ to 
restore the constitutional order distrupted by the Greek coup detat against Cyprus 
government131. Turkey claimed she was acting in compliance with the terms of the 1960 
Treaty of Guarantee. Following the intervention, the junta in Greece, collapsed and 
Constantine Karamanlis was recalled from self-imposed exile in Paris to form a new 
government. In Cyprus, Samson surrendered power to the President of the House of 
Representatives, Glafcos Clerides, pending the return of the island's constitutionally elected 
President, Archbishop Makarios, who had fled abroad to escape being killed during the coup.
Two unproductive conferences in Geneva followed, the first between Britain, Greece 
and Turkey and the second with the additional attendance of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot representatives. In Geneva Protocol (30 July 1974) which was constituted by six 
Articles, the existence of two autonomous communities was accepted. Turkey demanded from 
the Cypriot government to accept its plan for a federal state, and population transfer, with 
34% of the territory under Turkish Cypriot control. When President Clerides asked for 36 
hours to consult with Athens, Foreign minister Gunes denied Clerides on the grounds that 
Makarios and others would use it to play for more time. On 14 August, despite the fact that 
talks were still being held in Geneva, the Turkish army mounted a second full-scale 
offensive132, therefore Turkey's original pretext that it was invading in order to restore 
constitutional order, lost its cogency, in view of the fact that constitutional order had already 
been restored. International reactions against Turkey’s second military operation were far 
harsher than the first one. They pronounced Turkey’s action as ‘invasion’. On 13 February 
1975 Turkey declared the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus to be a "Federated 
                                                            
130 According to NATO advisor Athanasios Strigas, Henry Kissinger sent a secret telegram giving orders for 
Makarios to be deposed, because Cyprus' policy of non-alignment was considered unsatisfactory by US policy 
makers who saw Makarios as favouring the Soviet Union
131 Oran: 2001: p.742
132 Between Ecevit and Foreign Minister Turan Güneş a password was fixed which would determined the start of 
second military intervention. It was “Ayşe (Güneş’s daughter’s name) took a vacation”
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Turkish State". As a result, Turkey’s intervention of 1974 constituted a breakpoint in both 
Turkish Foreign Policy and in relations with Greece and other Western allies.
Appeal Court’s Decision on Non-Muslim Foundations
By 1972 within the context of Cyprus issue, The General Directory of Foundations 
(Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü) started to demand ‘constitution of foundation’ (vakıfname) 
merely from the non-Muslim owned foundations. They received negative answer as the non-
Muslim foundations were established by firman of sultan, hence did not have a vakıfname. 
Directory responded that answer as “I will look to the 1936 Declaration, if there is permission 
for you to get property than it is ok, otherwise I will levy the properties that you took after 
1936.”  But, the biggest blow came from the Appeal Court in 1974 when it decided that the 
declarations made by the minority foundations in 1936 were in fact charters. Unless it was 
clearly indicated in such a declaration that the foundation could acquire new possessions, 
acquisitions made after the declaraton had no legal validity. Therefore ‘illegally possessed’ 
properties would have to be returned to their former owners. Thus, minority foundations have 
lost innumerable amounts of real estate after 1974, as a result of the jurisprudence of the 
Appeal Court. They had taken one by one by the Directorate General of Foundations and the 
State Treasury.
One of the most scandalaous decision of the Appeal Court which created the so called 
‘1936 Decleration problem’ was occurred in the case of Balıklı Rum Hospital. The decision of 
the Appeal Court dated 8th May of 1974 in the case of the Balıklı Rum whose members were 
Turkish citizens of Greek origin reads as: “It appears that the acquisition of real estate by 
corporate bodies composed of non-Turkish people was forbidden. This is because corporate 
bodies are stronger than individuals and it is clear that the state may face various dangers in 
case there is no restriction on them to obtain real estate.” This decision was the proof for two 
realities: First one is that, the best interests of the State are above everything including the 
supremacy of law. Secondly, the highest court regarded Turkish citizens as foreigners and as a 
danger to the Turkish State. Etyen Mahcupyan133 clarifies the situation of these non-Muslim 
minorities as being ‘non-citizen’ for their state. A correction was made by the Appeal Court 
merely in the phrase of ‘non-Turkish’, nothing further...
In 2001, in the context of the harmonization process of Turkish Law with European 
Union law, some amendments were made in the Law of Foundations and minority foundation 
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were allowed to acquire real estate with the permission of the Committee of Ministers. Thus, 
three crucial reforms was made by these harmonization laws; permission to acquire real 
estate, and the opportunity to registrate the unregistrated ones. During the Ottoman Empire, 
they did not own legal personality, but instead, persons like nuns and priest even the dead 
holy persons took title deeds on themselves134. This had caused trouble after the establishment 
of the Turkish Republic. By the reforms of 2001, this problem was solved in legal terms but 
not in practise. On 10 October 2002, a bylaw was issued to guide the implementation of this 
law. Through this bylaw the scope of the law was restricted: According to 6th Article of the 
bylaw, a commission would be set up to evaluate the application of minority foundations 
demands to acquire new properties. The bylaw stipulated that this commission would decide 
whether the foundation concerned is in need to posses the real estate it wants to acquire. If the 
commission finds the demand appropriate, the file is sent to the Directorate of Foundations. 
Then if the Directorate of Foundations finds the demand appropriate, the file is sent to the 
Committee of Ministers. In this way, various filters were set up and made it impossible to 
obtain new property. In 9th Article of this bylaw there is a statement telling that Turkey shall 
reserve the rights derived from 45th Article of the Lausanne Treaty which is about the 
principal of reciprocity. It is trying to say that ‘if Greece does something bad to its Muslim 
citizens, I will do the same to my non-Muslim citizens.’ Once again, the rights of minorities 
and rule of law shall be the victim of political climate between two states, and this was clearly 
stated in that article. As Baskın Oran135 says, Turkish State wants to take her citizens as 
hostage for her race fellowmen (Turks in Western Thrace). On 11 October 2002 the 
Directorate of Foundations issued a circular which created more difficulties. According to 4th 
Article of this circular, requests that are found to be eligible shall be submitted to the Council 
of Ministers through the Directorate General of Foundations. So there is a new criterion here, 
which does not exist in the law or bylaw. 
We see a new arbitrary criterion again in 10th Article of this circular, which does not 
exist in the bylaw. Tenth Article says: when assessing the need (of the foundation for the 
property concerned), the population of the congregation residing in the municipality, where 
the real estate is to be acquired, shall be taken into consideration in the evaluation process. So 
if the members of the congregation concerned do not reside in the area or municipality where 
the real estate is located, or if the population of that specific congregation consists of an 
insignificant number, then it might be concluded that there is no need to acquire this real 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
133 Etyen Mahçupyan’s speech in  ‘Present and Future’ Conference dated 30.06.2006
134 Baskın Oran’s speech in  ‘Present and Future’ Conference dated 30.06.2006
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estate. This law (Law 4771), the bylaw and the circular were criticized by academicians and 
lawyers. The new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government made amendments in 
the law of foundations again, in January 2003, in the context of the harmonization laws (Law 
4778).  According to this amendment, minority foundations can acquire new properties with 
the permission of the Directorate of Foundations. Thus the bureaucracy has been reduced as 
the previous law required the permission of the Council of Ministers. 
In January 2003, again a new bylaw was issued to clarify the implementation of Law 
4778. Compare to the previous one, this new bylaw introducesd more flexible provisions and 
a less bureaucratic approach. There was no “commission” in this bylaw. Permission would be 
given directly by the Directorate General of Foundations. There was no indication of 
reciprocity in this bylaw either. However, 6th Article of this bylaw has some ambiguous 
expression. It said “The applications are forwarded to the Directorate General of 
Foundations...” it goes on saying “If necessary, the matter is submitted to the Council of 
Foundations, along with the views of the competent Directorate, after consultations with the 
relevant Ministries and public institutions.” These public institutions are probably the security 
and intelligence institutions136. In conclusion, the policies in relation to minority foundations 
constituted obvious violations of the Lausanne Treaty, Vianna Treaty and the European 
Convention on Human Rights to which Turkey is a party. But more importantly, Turkish State 
still puts a discriminatory wall based on ethnic difference between itself and its own citizens 
which is also against its own Constitution.
Today approximately, within 1076 properties, more than 400 properties are officially 
registrated, 1 of 3 is given to legal personal or to a person and 90 of them has inadequate 
permit in Istanbul.137 The 1936 Declaration was not a simple execution, it was the 
continuation of the Ottoman capital transferring policy from non-Muslims to Muslims. The 
right for property was violated and Vakıfbank raised its capital through the income of those 
properties belong to the non-Muslim communities. This was a totally judiacial attact but not 
legal. As Oran indicates, one can not make a capital transferation in the era of globalization. 
For Constantinos Tsitselikis, the most important solution is to handle the issue independent 
from reciprocity in the Turco-Greek relations which brings captivity to the subject. Dialoque 
and social empathy should be replaced by reciprocity-based practices. Secondly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
135 Baskın Oran (2004), “Türkiye’de Azınlıklar”, Tesev, İstanbul, pp.107
136 Oran, Ibid: 106
137 Konstandinos Tsitselikis’s speech of “The Pious Foundations of the Rum Communities in Istanbul” in the 
Conference of ‘Present and Future’ in 30.06.2006
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foundations should serve for the minorities not the verse. Self-control, transparency in 
administration are the urgent needs for the improvement of the situation of foundations.
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Conclusion
This study is aimed to focus on the Turkey’s state raised nationalism relative to its 
political, social, cultural and economic practices on non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The 
place of non-Muslims in the foreign policy of Turks is examined beginning from the last 
period of the Ottoman Empire, until the Cyprus Crisis in 1974. Rums, Armenians and Jews 
are chosen as the subject since they constituted a special position in the pre-republic period
and in the Lausanne Treaty. Their activity in the country’s economic machinary led to a 
policy of capital transfer such as Capital Tax Levy. Beyond the nationalization of the 
economy, the ironic official approach exhibits itself through treating its own citizens as 
‘foreign’. In this sense, the Turkification policies may seem to be self-contradictory, but their 
essential goal was not of inclusion but instead through means of social disturbance, inciting
them to leave. They had been regarded as dangerous, traitors, blood suckers, undesirable 
guests by the political elites. Sometimes these discriminative thoughts found ground in 
Turkish public opinion and still keeps the traces in the political culture of both media and 
society.
To grasp the ideological structure of Turkish nationalism, first we looked at the 
theoretical classifications of nationalism. If a nation is primarily a political entity, it has an 
inclusive structure, in which membership is not restricted to those who fulfill particular 
language, religious, ethnic or suchlike criteria. Civic and territorial conceptions of the nation 
regard it as a community of common laws and territorial citizenship But unlike territorial and 
civic versions of nationalism, ethnic nationalism conceives the nation as a genealogical and 
vernacular cultural community. It underlines the ‘otherness’ of the other and builts its own 
identity by this confrontation or conflict. Turkish nationalism, in this sense, stands close to 
German nationalism as both attribute a prominent role to the state. The state is not there to 
serve the people but demands unquestionable obedience as we see in Ficte’s, Hegel’s and 
Luther’s writings. The ideology of being apprehensive against external threats and the 
automatic perception of enemies are deeply internalized by Turkish nationalism.
The institutional structure and perception of the society in Ottoman Empire was based 
on ‘Millet System’ that classifies the communities according to their religion or religious sect. 
Problems of identity in relation to ‘citizenship’ were inevitable after the transition from multi-
ethnic Ottoman Empire, which had a relatively autonomus and heterogeneous population, to 
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the homogenization task of Turkish nation-building process based on the ‘one culture- one 
language- one ideal’ principle. The ideologic foundation of Turkish nationalism was 
politically handled first by the Union and Progrees Community, the Armenian Deportation 
and massacre was their project. Then, the Kemalist elites continued to make their own 
attributions to the process. Exchange of Rums and Turks in 1923, Events of Trace in 1934, 
The Capital Tax Levy and the deportation of the Rums were some of the social outcomes. All 
of these practices were exercised under the influence of the international conjecture, 
particularly security issues. 
Perception of threat, fueled by the memories of Sevr, maintains its liveliness even 
today. During the end of the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim minorities were considered the 
reason why the great powers for interfering the internal matters of Ottomans. After the 
Republic was founded, it became clear at the Lausanne Convention that the same approach 
was continuing in the minds of Republican elites like Ismet Inonu. Therefore, population 
exchange constituted ‘a great opportunity’ for Turkey. As an outcome of the exchange, people 
lost their homeland, proofs and memories of their personal history, together with their 
properties. Their ‘otherness’ came with them but in another cultural form, this time in the 
country they were expelled to. Our ‘infidel’Rums became ‘Turkish seeds’in Greece. This was 
like a tragical joke of history towards the etablis. Above all, the loss of shared experience is 
accompanied by growing ignorance of the ways of others; so, separation caused the loss of 
ground for communication. The sense of familiarity that carries the potential for 
understanding and respect was gone. Instead suspicion, hostility, prejudice and an inability to 
cooperate took its place, as we have frequently witnessed in Turkish-Greek relations. And the 
fate of those who were allowed to stay was sealed as hostages in the events in Greco-Turkish 
state relations.
As the Cyprus crisis deepened, Rum minority was used as a national scapegoat. Anti-
Greek sentiment peaked during the riots of 6–7 September in 1955. The whole thing was a 
fabricated provocation to prove that there was public support behind the government of the 
day- headed by Adnan Menderes, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zorlu was negotiating 
with Greece and Britain for a fair settlement on Cyprus in the post-British era. The Events of 
6–7 September were also used as an excuse for the government to apply pressure over press, 
the opposition and the student movement.
Inter-communal disturbances in Cyprus and the deterioration of Greek-Turkish 
relations during the 1960s had, again, a direct impact on the Rum Ortodox community in 
Turkey. As the Cyprus conflict increased, the Turkish public has turned its attention on the 
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Patriarchate, Rum citizens and Greek citizens in Turkey. ‘Citizen, speak Turkish’ campaigns 
and newspapers’ emphasis on the wealth of Rums began to increase, so a public opinion of
anti-Rum atmosphere was created. On 16 March, 1964 Turkey unilaterally denounced the 
Greek-Turkish Convention of Establishment, although the right of these people to remain in 
their native city was guaranteed by the 1923 Lausanne agreement. Aiming a retaliation 
against Greece, the Turkish Government cancelled the work and residence permits of 13,000 
Rums who were living and working in Turkey since the 1930 Ankara Convention. But Turkey 
lost the safety of the reciprocity status, so the Turkish-muslim minority in Western Thrace fell 
in to a disadvantaged position. Neither diplomatic nor economic benefits occurred as a result 
of the deportation, but a huge loss of cultural richness.
The 1936 Declaration was not a simple execution, it was the continuation of the 
Ottoman capital transferring policy from non-Muslims to Muslims. But the right for property 
was drastically violated when the Appeal Court in 1974 decided that the declarations made by 
the minority foundations in 1936 were in fact charters. Unless it was clearly indicated in such 
a declaration that the foundation could acquire new possessions, acquisitions made after the 
declaraton had no legal validity. Therefore ‘illegally possessed’ properties would have to be 
returned to their former owners. Thus, minority foundations have lost innumerable amounts of 
real estate after 1974, as a result of the jurisprudence of the Appeal Court. They were taken 
one by one by the Directorate General of Foundations and the State Treasury.
All of these policies have showed a harsh reality; state and the central population has at 
all times regarded the non-Muslim minority as the ‘guest’ or even ‘second-rate citizens’. 
‘When the time is ripe, they will obediently leave the lands they inhabited never truly owned
by them.’ As with all nationalist policies born out of discrimination between ‘us and them’, 
one can comfortably make the argument that both the past and the future of the non-Muslim 
community has affectively been usurped.
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